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(Piatelli-Palmarini
1980
), that are associated with different organising paradigms
(Maruyama
1977
), and “world hypotheses” (Pepper
1942
). Where order comes from
order, novelty is but a preformationist unfolding of latent possibility or recombina-
tion of existing parts; where order arises from noise, chaos, formlessness, or am-
biguity, novelty entails
de novo
formation of new realms of possibility vis-à-vis
existing observational and interpretive frameworks.
My purpose in considering emergence and this combinatoric-creative distinction
is and has always been primarily pragmatic. For this reason, we focus here primar-
ily on developing heuristics for generating useful novelty rather than in engaging in
philosophical debates over the status of emergent novelty vis-a-vis various postu-
lated ontological frameworks. For useful general introductions to the philosophical
problems and their implications for mind-body relations, free will, and ontological
emergence, see Kim (
2008
) and Clayton (
2004
). For similar reasons we will almost
entirely sidestep the literature on complexity and emergence. Complexity in and of
itself does not necessarily produce anything useful, nor does it necessarily provide
insights into how to do so. On the other hand, variety is the mother of invention, and
increased structural complexity does provide variety in the form of more accessible
states and effective degrees of freedom. Processes of “complication” (von Neumann
1951
) thus serve as fodder for new functions.
15.2.1 What Constitutes a New Primitive?
Both kinds of emergence, combinatoric and creative, entail recognition of basic sets
of possibilities that constitute the most basic building blocks of the order, i.e. its
atomic parts or “primitives”.
By a “primitive”, we mean an indivisible, unitary entity, atom, or element in a
system that has no internal parts or structure of its own in terms of its functional role
in that system. Individual symbols are the primitives of symbol string systems, bi-
nary distinctions are the primitives of flip-flop-based digital computers, and machine
states are the primitives of finite state automata. To paraphrase Gregory Bateson, a
primitive is a unitary “difference that makes a difference”.
Emergence then entails either the appearance of new combinations of previously
existing primitives or the formation of entirely new ones (Fig.
15.1
). The primitives
in question depend upon the discourse; they can be structural, material “atoms”; they
can be formal “symbols” or “states”; they can be functionalities or operations; they
can be primitive assumptions of a theory; they can be primitive sensations and/or
ideas; they can be the basic parts of an observer's model.
Most commonly, the primitives are assumed to be structural, the parts that are
put together in various combinations to make aggregate structures. Reductionist
biology in effect assumes that everything that one would want to say about bio-
logical organisms can be expressed in terms of molecular parts. For many contexts
and purposes, such as molecular biology and pharmaceutical development, where
structure is key, this is an appropriate and effective framework. For other pursuits,
