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incentivise, intensify and exploit creative discovery through the distribution of re-
sources and power (Csikszentmihalyi
1996
). Consider an illustrative example from
Sobel (
1996
): at the height of colonial competition a grand challenge for naval sci-
ence was the discovery of a technique to determine longitude at sea. Whilst latitude
could be determined entirely from the height of stars above the horizon, longitude
could only be reckoned in this way relative to the time of day, which could not be
known accurately using existing clocks. Errors in longitude estimation could be dis-
astrous, costing time, money and lives, and the demand for a solution intensified as
the problem of longitude became increasingly pivotal to naval supremacy. A sub-
stantial prize was offered by the British government, and the prize stood for many
years before being claimed. The solution came from a lone, self-taught clockmaker,
John Harrison, who made numerous small innovations to improve clock accuracy.
Of interest here is not only John Harrison himself but the great efforts invested
by his competitors in pursuit of the prize money. Some had far flung ideas, others
pursued fanciful but reasonable alternatives, others still were clockmakers like Har-
rison himself, pursuing different techniques. More serious competition came in the
form of an astronomical solution which required knowing the future trajectory of
the moon for years to come. Together, these disparate groups “collaborated through
competition” to discover the solution to the problem of longitude, naturally divid-
ing their efforts between different domains, and giving each other clear ground to
occupy a certain region of the search space.
Here, within-group competition was artificially driven by a prize, constrained by
certain socially imposed factors: the prize money established a common goal, and
awareness of existing research drove specific innovators down divergent pathways,
and incentivised outsiders to bring their skills to the challenge. The prize encour-
aged outsiders with far-flung interests to put effort into a solution, and at no expense
to the government. This underlines the difference between a prize, for which only
one innovator from the domain gains, and a series of grants for research. The former
is indifferent to effort, excellence or even potential and is motivated by uncertainty
about where a winning solution might turn up. Like the fitness function in an optimi-
sation algorithm, it cares only for success, and it has a clear means for determining
success. The latter invests in potential and uses effort and excellence as indicators of
likely success. Both forms of finance played a role in establishing the solution, since
Harrison actually received occasional grants from the Board of Longitude to fund
his gradual development, indicating that they has some confidence in a clock-based
solution. Harrison was once a maverick outsider, drawn by the prize. Through his
early promising efforts he became a refined and trusted investigator, deserving of
further funding.
Only through the constant jostle of shifting social interaction can this outcome
be explained. Historical examples of social creativity such as the Longitude Prize
have helped to build our modern world of research councils, music industry major
labels and venture capitalism, for example by demonstrating the powerful creative
potential of open markets. Harrison, an unlikely outsider to the challenge, was first
motivated, then identified as having a chance, then allowed to flourish. The prize
also had its losers, whose time and perhaps great talent went unrewarded, wasted
