Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
Whether we prioritise intellectual or emotive forces, the acceptance of Gell's
(
1998
) thesis negates such oppositions by arguing that
all
components of the cre-
ative process exert some agency. We suggest that the degree of such agency is not
really of concern because the interactive nature of a creative partnership and the
networked nature of a creative ecosystem inevitably involve some conflict and res-
olution, whether conscious or otherwise, and the only real concern is the status of
the resultant art object itself. Contributions to the creative process can come from
many directions, and while computational partners provide new opportunities, the
complicated network of direct and indirect influences has long been acknowledged.
. . . in truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things,
which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every topic in literature,
science and art borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known
and used before.
16
No art production takes place in a vacuum, and is inherently made up of a nexus
of eclectic forces, from the selection on instruments to the surroundings in which we
develop our work. On the contrary, hermetically sealing our work within an isolation
chamber would serve to starve it of the oxygen that it requires to live.
Despite this acknowledgement, the fear of technological control over our activi-
ties is deeply embedded in our culture. Themes such as these are pervasive in liter-
ature and film, from the 19th-century uncanny of Hoffmann's
The Sandman
to the
dystopias of
1984
, the Borg species of
Star Trek
and the androids of
Blade Runner
.
The ubiquity of networked agencies such as Web recommender systems, however,
is surely beginning to allay these concerns in the public eye.
The “Invisible Hand” Argument
Like with other tools, the design and develop-
ment of generative music software locks in aspects of the maker's aesthetic judge-
ment. When developing a tool which reflects a given process, certain decisions are
made regarding the implementation, style, and scale of application. Further, when
we incorporate general-purpose algorithmic tools the pertinence of this kind of ar-
gument rears its head in a different form: are we incorporating another
person's
creative work into our own?
As previously stated, our view is that all creative work is linked closely to its pre-
decessors and the field in which it is located (Bown
2009
). Insofar as we are taking
a system and moulding it to our own goals and ends, adapting the frameworks of a
third party are no more invidious than reading a magazine or visiting an exhibition
in search of inspiration. Whether technological or conceptual, the raw material of
ideas exists to be rebuilt, remixed and extended.
The “Creative Vitalism” Argument
As we have seen previously, the objection
to the idea that a computer can perform creative acts is deeply embedded in some
parts of society. Noticing the level of emotive reactions to Cope's
EMI
computa-
tional composition system, Dennett comments:
16
Emerson v. Davies
, 8 F.Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (CCD Mass. 1845).
