References - Nonlinear Oligopolies: Stability and Bifurcations - page 313

Bischi, G. I., Chiarella, C., & Kopel, M. (2004b). The long run outcomes and global dynamics
of a duopoly game with misspecified demand functions. International Game Theory Review ,
6 (3), 343-380.
Bischi, G. I., Dawid, H., & Kopel, M. (2003b). Spillover effects and the evolution of firm clusters.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 50 , 47-75.
Bischi, G. I., & Gardini, L. (1998). Role of invariant and minimal absorbing areas in chaos
synchronization. Physical Review E , 58 , 5710-5719.
Bischi, G. I., Gardini, L., & Kopel, M. (2000a). Analysis of global bifurcations in a market share
attraction model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control , 24 , 855-879.
Bischi, G. I., Gardini, L., & Mira, C. (1999). Plane maps with denominator. Part I: Some generic
properties. International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos , 9 (1), 119-153.
Bischi, G. I., Gardini, L., & Mira, C. (2001a). Maps with a vanishing denominator. A survey of
some results. Nonlinear Analysis , 47 (4), 2171-2185.
Bischi, G. I., Gardini, L., & Mira, C. (2003a). Plane maps with denominator. Part II: Noninvertible
maps with simple focal points. International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos , 13 (8),
2253-2277.
Bischi, G. I., & Kopel, M. (2001). Equilibrium selection in a nonlinear duopoly game with adaptive
expectations. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 46 (1), 73-100.
Bischi, G. I., & Kopel, M. (2003 a ). Long run evolution, path dependence and global properties of
dynamic games: A tutorial. CUBO Mathematical Journal , 5 (3), 437-468.
Bischi, G. I., & Kopel, M. (2003 b ). Multistability and path dependence in a dynamic brand
competition model. Chaos, Solitons & Fractals , 18 , 561-576.
Bischi, G. I., Kopel, M., & Szidarovszky, F. (2005). Expectation-stock dynamics in multi-
agent fisheries. In Contributions to the Theory of Games (Vol. 137, pp. 299-329) of Annals
of Operations Research .
Bischi, G. I., & Lamantia, F. (2002). Nonlinear duopoly games with positive cost externalities due
to spillover effects. Chaos, Solitons & Fractals , 13 , 808-822.
Bischi, G. I., Mammana, C., & Gardini, L. (2000b). Multistability and cyclic attractors in duopoly
games. Chaos, Solitons & Fractals , 11 , 543-564.
Bischi, G. I., Mroz, L., & Hauser, H. (2001b). Studying basin bifurcations in nonlinear triopoly
games by using 3D visualization. Nonlinear Analysis , 47 (8), 5325-5341. (Special issue WCNA
2000).
Bischi, G. I., & Naimzada, A. (1999). Global analysis of a duopoly game with bounded rationality.
In J. A. Filar, V. Gaitsgory & M. Koichi (Eds.), Advances in dynamic games and applications
(Vol. 5, pp. 361-385). Boston: Birkhauser.
Bischi, G. I., Naimzada, A., & Sbragia, L. (2007). Oligopoly games with local monopolistic
approximation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 62 , 371-388.
Bischi, G. I., Sbragia, L., & Szidarovszky, F. (2008). Learning the demand function in a repeated
Cournot oligopoly game. International Journal of Systems Science , 39 (4), 403-419.
Bonanno, G., & Zeeman, C. (1985). Limited knowledge of demand and oligopoly equilibria.
Journal of Economic Theory , 35 , 276-283.
Bresnahan, T. F. (1986). Quantifying the competitive effects of production joint ventures.

International Journal of Industrial Organization , 4 , 155-175.
Brock, W., & Hommes, C. (1997). A rational route to randomness. Econometrica , 65 (5),

1059-1095.
Brousseau, V., & Kirman, A. (1993). The dynamics of learning in N-person games with the
wrong N. In K. Binmore, A. Kirman, & P. Tani (Eds.), Frontiers of game theory (pp. 71-93).
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT.
Bulow, J., Geanakoplos, J., & Klemperer, P. (1985 a ). Holding idle capacity to deter entry. The
Economic Journal , 95 , 178-182.
Bulow, J., Geanakoplos, J., & Klemperer, P. (1985 b ). Multimarket oligopoly: Strategic substitutes
and complements. Journal of Political Economy , 93 , 488-511.
Chiarella, C., Dieci, R., & Gardini, L. (2001). Asset price dynamics in a financial market with
fundamentalists and chartists. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society , 6 , 69-99.