Interpretation of Surface Features of Mars as a Function of Its Verbal—Toponymic—and Visual Representation - Maps for the Future Children Education and Internet - page 105

terms themselves, this way to generate meanings based on his or her terrestrial
geographic experience modified by the preconceptions originating from fiction and
non-fiction literature on the planet in question (this includes esoteric literature in
many cases). I emphasize that this “concretizing” effect may be negligible for
planetary scientists but may well suppress the intended message of the planetary
cartographer in the case of the non-expert map readers. Philosophical phenomenol-
ogy can't be applied to hard sciences, but any cartographic product is only a
generalized (human) representation of the physical world, therefore subjective
experiences in its perception are inevitable. Planetary maps—along with other
maps—are human phenomena, based on (but not equal to) the physical reality,
especially when considering their perception process.
Planetary nomenclature may be even more sensitive to cultural aspects since it
mixes physical reality with social reality.
Nomenclature is part of the human language. One of Wittgenstein's main ideas
is that “The propositions show the logical form of reality” (Wittgenstein
1922 :4.121) In practice, place-names are only parts of the propositions (“thoughts
with a sense”) but in fact, a planetary place-name is also a full proposition which
proposes that a feature (linked to reality—a specified place and area on a specified
planet—by the Gazetteer) belongs to a particular geomorphic (and often, geologic)
category. Applying this idea to the structure of descriptor terms (but not the
specifics!) makes sense: descriptor terms show the logical form of reality.
Wittgenstein's famous “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world”
(Wittgenstein 1922 :5.6) statement can also be applied to planetary nomenclature.
Its function is not only to be a “tool” as stated by the IAU Rules (USGS 2011 )but
also to expand human Oikumene by connecting (previously) alien worlds' surface
features to the human world.
John Searle ( 1997 ) differentiates brute facts that can exist independently of
humans and our institutions from institutional facts that require human institutions
for their existence. He goes further, saying that “in order to state a brute fact we
require the institution of language, but the fact stated needs to be distinguished from
the statement of it”. However, in planetary nomenclature we baptize physical
objects and by doing this we connect them to our culture and also we delimit
them (by defining their sizes) and classify them (according to our current geological
understanding). Physical objects—or rather, their names and cartographic
representations—become parts of our social reality when shown on maps labeled
and defined. Brute facts are now inseparably connected to institutional facts by
IAU's nomenclature and the chosen visual representation methods. In turn, they are
mentally linked to science, high and pop culture, sci-fi universes, etc. Names (and
certainly some categories) of planetary surface features exist only in the minds and
mental maps of humans.
The perception of Geographical names is different when they are read from
when they are heard. Reading a planetary geographical name is looking at its
standardized symbol—a string of Roman characters, a label (Kadmon 2000 ). It is
a typical example of artificial names that were born in written form. But still, they
also become spoken words, parts of the oral tradition; and for many students they