Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
which are complex organizational problems and serious contributing fac-
tors to near-misses, incidents, and accidents.
Briefly, the first barrier is physical or technological, essentially owing
to the design of the technology itself. Typically, massive concrete
walls, fire- and explosion-proof structures, earthquake-proof structures,
flooding-proof levees, or spill receptacles are technological in nature.
Administrative barriers constitute a second line of defense, through
detailed procedures, that describe the exact functioning and limitations
of each safety agency. They also provide preventive maintenance and
routine surveillance to limit exposure to potential problems and to check
potential degradation of passive barriers. Organizational barriers are
a third defense. They describe the exact responsibilities of each cate-
gory of employee and a description of key processes along with a pre-
determined division of labor covering various situations for all stages,
from the routine production mode to the emergency mode. Formal
communication flows and standardized language are also provided, as
well as the emphasis on formal and informal debriefing and opportuni-
ties to exchange freely on surprises and unwanted events. Finally, ade-
quate training, personnel selection, and specific licensing can be consid-
ered individual barriers . In addition, these industries have put in place
access limitations and diverse devices (alarms, red flags, and signature
checkpoints on procedures) to avoid breaches in the defenses or to warn
employees about possible breaches. The key point is to provide the
first-line actors with an updated view of the state of the system at all
times.
It is of interest to note in passing that the medical field is also inter-
ested in this line of thinking, and is struggling to put in place system
barriers capable of reducing preventable errors (Amalberti et al., 2005;
Carroll & Rudolph, 2006).
This description is not aimed at suggesting that those barriers are
sufficient to guarantee operational safety. Of course they are not. The
whole debate after Chernobyl led to the recognition that much more
was needed to operate such complex systems and ensure reliability and
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