Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
The institutional analysis is based on the assumption that policies will affect certain
areas of reality, which are already subject to valid and (more or less) effective
institutions. An understanding of the prevailing institutional context in which a
policy is to be implemented is necessary to assess intended and unintended conse-
quences (Aligica
2005
; Esty et al.
2005
: 11; Bickers and Williams
2001
: 235).
Thus, on the one hand, appropriate institutions increase the likelihood of
actually achieving the policy objectives, i.e., they increase the likelihood
of actors' compliance and (intended) change of behaviour. On the other
hand, appropriate institutions ensure that these policy objectives are achieved at
reasonable costs. Policy instruments that have proven to be very cost-effective in
one specific institutional context might perform rather poorly in another, i.e., they
might be not effective at all, or they might induce higher costs to become effective.
For example, a regulatory or command-and-control policy that puts a ceiling on
the allowed amount of pesticides used per hectare and year might be ineffective
if there is no authority in place to monitor and sanction farmers' non-compliance.
Here, effectiveness could be increased by establishing such an institutional
mechanism; yet, the costs for establishing it might be substantial, thus, reduc-
ing the cost-effectiveness. The justifiable costs to be borne by society to make
the policy effective cannot be defined by scientists; it depends upon public
opinion and political will. However, the role of scientists can be to identify and
to specify those transaction costs in a more transparent manner. This information
would enable policy makers to design better policies and to make their choices
on a more solid basis.
In particular if agricultural, environmental, and rural policies are concerned,
suitable governance structures have to address the specificities of nature-related
transactions, constraints in accessing information, and the prevailing interde-
pendencies of the actors, i.e., the fact that the choice of one actor may influence the
choices other actors make. These characteristics are often overlooked in conven-
tional economics which assumes that agents are independent (Paavola and Adger
2005)
and largely ignores the complexity of nature-related transactions (Hagedorn
et al.
2002
; Hagedorn
2008)
. Political jurisdictions targeted by a policy have to
match, in an appropriate manner, with the range of physical, economic, social and,
in particular, institutional linkages found in the rural areas and in the agricultural
sector. If carefully designed, governance structures can facilitate communication
and co-ordination among diverse networks of stakeholders in EU agricultural,
environmental, and rural policy making, thus, making effective policy implementa-
tion more likely.
The institutional analysis within the SEAMLESS project is being conceptualised
to reveal where (in which country or region) a policy option in the implemen-
tation phase of the policy cycle would be compatible with the existing insti-
tutional structures, and where an institutional misfit that is likely to hamper
policy implementation can be expected. Thus, not the institutional performance,
such as transparency and distributional fairness, to reach policy objectives is
analysed, but whether policy characteristics fit or misfit the institutional arrange-
ments in place.
