Innovative Product Development and Technology Adoption for Medical Applications - Biomaterials Science: An Integrated Clinical and Engineering Approach - page 273

The naming of a technology has a great effect on the uses that are consid-
ered for its adoption. For this reason we need to look at other technology areas
for those critical component technologies that can assist us in transitioning a
laboratory development to a capability to fill the customer's request. We fre-
quently hear about the “not invented here” syndrome. In my experience in
the development of military systems, it has consistently come into focus that
the naming of a system is critical to the future use of that system's capabili-
ties in the field. It's only human nature for the inventor and program man-
ager want to have the legacy system named after their service or group. The
military gets around that roadblock usually by naming it “Joint …,” which is
sometimes not totally correct. However, the thought process is sound. If you
develop an imagery distribution system that is going to be used to distribute
the magnetic resonance imagery (MRI) to the radiologist and the doctor, it is
natural for you to name it an MRI distribution system. The issue comes up
when in the future we want to use that same imagery system to distribute
documents that have been scanned into the system and recorded in the same
imagery format as the MRI data. Believe it or not, the software can't tell one
JPEG file from another. It is sometimes difficult to come up with a name
that describes the capabilities of the system without using the initial appli-
cation in the title. It's helpful to think of systems or components in terms of
what they do as a capability. This naming criterion is also important when
the inventor is looking for other critical technologies to complete the system
design. In the military acquisition system, this process is called the analysis
of alternatives .
In competitive technology intelligence, these are called technical options .
When we are working in the technology development of new products,
such as a laptop, one alternative is to make a better laptop to generate
competitive advantage. It can be lighter, last longer on a battery charge,
and have a brighter screen or some other factor. It could also take a totally
different approach and be an iPad, which has no ability to print, connects
through a 3G connection to the Internet, and can automatically be linked
to a bookseller to download a book. By the way, that same book cannot be
read on a laptop.
One of my first developments was a microbolometer infrared detector.
This detector was based on a new uncooled focal plane that was developed
by an industry partner under funding from the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA). I was asked to transition this technology to the
combat forces. The detector prototype that was presented to me was enor-
mously expensive and was encased in a Plexiglas box. For this technology
to transition, it was critical to get it into the hands of the customer and to
generate a valid concept of operation that gave it an advantage over the cur-
rent night-vision goggles that were in extensive use. When we first entered
the caves of Afghanistan, that concept became clear. The microbolometer
infrared detectors were called “pocketscopes.” They weighed 12 ounces and
operated for five hours on two double-A batteries. The principle of operation