Structural Properties of Cryptographic Sequences - Computational Intelligence in Security for Information Systems - page 157

et al. [34] show good results and achieve resistance against collusion. Note that
overhead depends, among other values, on the security parameter, which results
in a tradeoff between security and bandwidth usage. Key life-span refers to user
keys lifetime: some schemes, such as Staddon et al. [33] and Liu et al. [34],
require the user key to be renewed after m sessions. That is clearly a drawback
since it increases the workload at the Key Server side and bandwidth usage,
specially in faulty networks which is the case. To conclude, we believe that self-
healing schemes still have several challenges to overcome, mainly: costly setup
phases that must be repeated after m sessions, generalizing a constant use of
storage, going further on bandwidth usage reduction and overcoming the usual
security-communication overhead tradeoff.
5 Conclusions
This paper shows a survey on the field that includes some of the latest propos-
als. Table 4 compares the different schemes introduced along the paper according
to their features: “Cat.”, category, either (1) general-purpose, (2) multi-group
or (3) ad-hoc oriented; “Stful/Stless”, stateful or stateless; “Coll.Res.”, collu-
sion resistant; and “Keys tree”, use of the hierarchical tree approach. Still new
proposals appear each year and, with the popularization of new scenarios like
IPTV and specially ad-hoc networks, the desirable features for a secure multi-
cast scheme are evolving: low bandwidth and faulty links demand to reduce the
number and frequency of communications with the Key Server and the possibil-
ity to recover from information loss. It seems clear that this trend will increase
in the foreseeable future.
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