Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
vegetarianism win the day, fewer animals would exist, ergo, eating meat is an overall
good for animals. The vegetarian counterargument (we saw) is that appealing to
quantity is never enough, as life's value is not exhausted by its worth in relation to
the living entity itself, and relates too to determining whether such a life should be
lived (vegetarians thus do not subscribe to the more-is-better claim). But if mere ex-
istence is not enough for vegans or for vegetarians, why accept the vegetarian claim
that their alternative is better for animals than the vegan one?
The question whether some lives should be lived can itself be partly determined by
qualitative aspects: a life of perpetual torture or exploitation should not be lived if
such can be prevented in advance. But like the quantitative dimension (that is, wheth-
er entities do or do not exist), the qualitative aspect too does not exhaust the matter:
it may be the case that a pleasant life should not be lived if it ends in a way that is
immoral. Call this the “teleological” dimension of the value of a life. We usually do
not bring lives into the world with a plan, at least not for humans. Yet some plans
constitute a misrecognition of what having a life means. Say someone brings me into
the world for fifteen pleasant years, planning to euthanize me painlessly when these
are over. Again, from an internal perspective, such a life is better than no life at all,
and unlike being brought into the world to be a prostituted child, here such existence
is qualitatively unproblematic. Still, no one would be justified in bringing people into
the world with this purpose in mind.
The issue is not merely one of violating rights that are, let us assume, exclusive to
humans. Such lives, human or nonhuman, should not be lived (to take our previous
nonhuman example, say someone breeds dogs just to have the chance to painlessly
euthanize young puppies). Teleological violations of life's value can then relate to the
temporal length of that life. Accidental or natural premature death is sad for humans
and non-humans, though it is not immoral. But instituting a practice in which prema-
ture death is intended for the born entity is morally wrong and cannot be excused
through the entity's gain by living. Teleological violations can also relate to manners
of exploitation, and this too need not be associated with a qualitatively negative ex-
perience. The film
The Matrix
depicts a scenario in which human beings are brought
into the world, lead monitored illusory lives from start to finish that can be pleasant,
solely for the production of energy that their bodies create. Such living is better than
not living at all, but it is not hard to imagine someone saying that such a life should
not be lived.
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VEGETARIAN UTOPIA
Benefiting or harming a future life is, then, determined by three dimensions: the
quantitative (that is, whether such a life exists), the qualitative (the nature of the fu-
ture existence in terms of suffering vs. pleasure), and the teleological (whether a pur-
