Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
ing, here Kitty does not gain anything by the procedure. And so there is reason for a
veterinarian not to cooperate with this request. In an ideal world, no owner who cares
that much for her sofa will take in a cat. The veterinarian ought to urge the owner
to withdraw her request. If, however, the owner insists and there is a strong possibil-
ity that the cat will be abandoned if the procedure is not conducted, it is overall bet-
ter for the cat to be declawed, and so the veterinarian should perform the procedure.
The overall utility of simply outlawing declawing for animals (as is the case in San
Francisco, where such legislation seems very close) is thus unclear. For the same util-
itarian considerations, maiming animals in order to have them as pets, or actions that
violate what they are (wing trimming in birds, caging birds), have nothing to do with
the animal's own welfare. As far as I can tell, such actions do seem to be a loss to
the animal, and they do seem to be experienced as such. Unlike cats, dogs, and
horses, birds in the wild lead better lives than caged ones. Caging a bird appears to
me to be in the same category as socially isolating a dog or a chimpanzee: some dis-
tortion of what that animal is (“distortion” in the sense of systematically frustrating
some constitutive need in a way that seems to be experienced as such). The greater
safety that they gain does not counterbalance the losses birds like parrots pay for
sharing their lives with humans. The same argument applies to keeping wild animals
as pets: most are better off in the wild.
Pets can of course be maltreated, and veterinarians ought not be idealized, since
financial incentives sometimes turn them into tools that satisfy any whim an owner
may express. Nor do I mean to shortcut the problematic nature of disconnecting an-
imals from members of their own species. Some pets are loners (cats); others learn to
treat humans as their pack (dogs). Disconnection, in such cases, does not appear
problematic. The situation with regard to simian helpers of disabled humans is less
clear. Pro-animal utopia will probably involve some reform of pet husbandry, training,
and medicine. But such reform will not be radical. Pets benefit from leading lives
with humans, and the price they pay is small in comparison. Companion animal hus-
bandry looks like a reasonable ex-change: pets do lose through this relationship, but
they get to lead safe and comfortable lives, and they die when they are old or sick.
The alternative of a petless world does not strike me as morally superior or as over-
all better for animals.
Here, then, is a model of human-animal relationships that, although we call all the
shots (saying what seems “reasonable,” “acceptable,” “plausible exchange,” etc.), is
morally justified on utilitarian grounds; a model in which the overall good is determ-
ined in relation to all the entities concerned, even when it does prescribe invasive ac-
tions and curtailing the animal's freedom.
