Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
Chapter 5
USE OR EXPLOITATION?
THIS SECTION OF THE BOOK examines practices that do not involve killing non-
human animals. The status of animals that live their lives in zoos or farms, or func-
tion as companion animals (pets) or therapy animals, is debated among liberationists.
Some perceive each of these practices as further manifestations of speciesist culture
that ought to be eradicated in a just world. Other liberationists accept some but not all
of these practices. Aside from liberationists, determining the moral status of these prac-
tices is important, not merely because it specifies and rationalizes the envisaged reform
being proposed, but also because it affects numerous individuals who are personally in-
volved in such practices and who regard themselves as deeply attached to the animals
with which they interact. Pet owners are sometimes morally concerned about actions
like limiting their pet's freedom, or subjecting the animal to invasive procedures that
curtail its reproductive capacity. Practitioners of animal-assisted therapy are themselves
often animal lovers who worry about the morality (or lack of it) of such uses of the
animals for which they deeply care. Moral vegetarians doubt that their personal protest
is insufficient, and that veganism is the more consistent moral decision.
Morally assessing such practices is an outcropping of the distinction between use
and exploitation. If such a distinction is impossible to draw, than virtually all animal-
related practices should disappear in a just world. Antipet liberationists and some mor-
al vegans are in effect endorsing this categorical position. On the other hand, if ex-
ploitation can be set apart from use, than liberationism proves to be a more flexible
position that can accommodate some animal-related practices while objecting to others.
The issue here is sometimes entangled by the deployment of “instrumentality” and
avoiding “instrumentalizing” others, an idea that is repeatedly invoked yet difficult to
unpack clearly, even in human contexts. We routinely use our friends and relatives for
emotional or physical support. We use other people for their abilities, knowledge, and
work power, and such give-and-take relations are legitimate. The relevant moral dis-
tinction is accordingly not the one between instrumentalization and noninstrumentaliza-
tion, but the one between use and exploitation. Kant was unhelpful regarding this,
holding that whereas in some contexts it is permissible to treat another person as a
means, it is immoral to perceive another person merely as a means. This position is
notoriously vague, since it appeals to private motivations that are easily given to ma-
nipulation and rationalization. People can (and do) exploit others while commending
themselves for negligible concessions that they make for the benefit of the exploited
party.
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