Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
a “lifeboat situation.” And since the immoral practice furthers knowledge and thera-
peutic capacity and is not directed at some morally dubious end, such research should
continue given the strong prudential reasons that support it. The claims of science
versus the claims of animals are not a simple case of morality versus prudence. Rep-
rehensible examples of the latter clash, from Plato's ring of Gyges on, involve egoist-
ic benefits rather than the ones science provides. Unlike self-serving acts, in this spe-
cific clash, prudence—if therapy is mere prudence—should override morality. Practical
reasoning does not include only moral considerations, and in this particular case,
practical reasoning should lead us to support research, even if it is immoral. There
are other examples—e.g., some strategic decisions in wartime—wherein complex de-
cisions involve an interplay between moral and nonmoral considerations, the latter
overriding the former. A military decision maker led by moral considerations alone
will probably be making some wrong decisions.
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Apart from the argument from practical reasoning, a different argument that sup-
ports research while acknowledging its nonmoral nature rests on a distinction between
immoral and nonmoral actions. Stealing food from a starving person is immoral.
When the person doing the stealing is himself starving, the action is still immoral,
but few will blame the thief. The inability to blame results both from considerations
of empathy (in the sense that people realize that if they were starving, they would re-
sort to the same actions) and from the situation being one of necessity: due to the
either-or nature of the act and the compulsion to choose the lesser of two evils. Call
such actions “nonmoral.” The ability or inability to blame the person doing the dubi-
ous action (“inability to blame” in the sense above) is partly what sets the difference
between nonmoral and immoral actions. Experimentation that saves lives at the ex-
pense of animals can be claimed to be in this sense “nonmoral” rather than “immor-
al”: it involves an either-or situation and is designed to prevent a weighty harm. No
one who cares for a relative afflicted with an incurable illness can be blamed if she
supports animal-dependent research. Can we then likewise say that the use of experi-
mental animals is not desirable but is acceptable?
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Both arguments articulate the same line: we sometimes accept immoral conduct.
But the disanalogy between plausible applications of these arguments and the specific
issue of experimenting on animals arises upon perusing the cases in human-human
morality where “lesser of two evil” arguments are in fact accepted. In human-human
morality, immoral conduct can be excused in cases where (a) the action has no feas-
ible alternatives that generate less harm, (b) the person performing the immoral act
has searched hard for these alternatives, even if such were not ultimately discovered,
(c) the act is necessary in the sense that not acting in the immoral way is likely to
imply some great harm, (d) the action involves the agent's recognition regarding the
