Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
to assert that animals can be experimented upon, one is begging this discussion's
question by merely stipulating which entitlements animals in fact possess or lack. The
superiority claim is not question-begging. It strives to show some linkage between the
more inclusive protections humans have and the permissibility of experiments. Yet
where and how can one locate such a linkage? Short of self-defense—and experi-
mentation on animals is not a form of self-defense—the scope of one's own protec-
tions never extends to the permissibility of harming others.
An alternative rendering of “degrees” and “value” that does not beg our question
would appeal to some vague sense of “worth”: we are “more valuable” than they are,
hence we may experiment on them. Yet being endowed with some higher
“value”—allow the upholder of this defense to leave the content of “value”
open—does not permit the more valuable entity to harm beings of lower value. Nor
does superior value connect smoothly with having more protection than entities pos-
sessing inferior value. It is conceivable to have beings of “lower worth” covered by
protections that are similar to, or even greater than, those extended to beings of a
higher value. An obtuse capitalist may emphatically assert that disabled individuals
are less valuable than healthy and highly productive ones yet still see society as ob-
liged to extend more inclusive protections to disabled individuals. So what can plaus-
ibly correlate value with levels of protection?
To clarify the point I am attacking, I present the argument that to my mind unne-
cessarily bewitches pro-animal philosophers into arguing for equal considerability. Ad-
mitting dissimilar “status,” they fear, will make the following reasoning sound:
1. Humans are worthier than animals.
2. The greater value of humans over animals
just means
or
entails
extending lim-
ited protection to animals.
3. “Limited protection”
means
that some actions that ought not be done to humans
can be directed at animals (even if the latter are eligible for some moral protection),
and this can be done if a substantial justification is supplied and some worthy cause
is specified.
In the context of the ethics of research, it would now follow that:
4. Using animals in research presents a worthy cause: it exhibits the right virtues
and promotes overall good consequences both to people and to some animals.
5. Conclusion: animal use in research is justified.
I reject (2) above. We tend to think that (2) is plausible for three reasons: first,
similar status has been repeatedly
correlated
with sharing identical protections, hence
it seems reasonable to associate dissimilar status with different protections. Second,
arguing for lower considerability has been repeatedly used (rather, misused) to excuse
extending only limited protection. Third, no protection can be granted to beings that
