Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
imals, or that these interests count for more than animal interests in a utilitarian cal-
culus.
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To conclude, animals cannot be denied moral status. Yet this does not imply that
they possess “it.” Animals have morally relevant properties, properties, that is, that
call for moral restrictions on what may be done to them. These properties include the
capacity to be subjected to negative experience, and the capacity to be harmed even
if such harm is not experienced. The recognition that animals exemplify such proper-
ties is intuitive, widely shared, and manifested in the consensual desire to eliminate
cruelty to animals. Given such recognition, it is untenable to limit ourselves to reject-
ing only some forms of cruelty rather than striving to eliminate or diminish all forms
of unnecessary suffering. Older forms of dismissal of animals that could justify limit-
ing our concern to cruelty alone—Cartesian, Kantian—can no longer be validly
summoned. This opens the door to abolishing or substantially reforming age old insti-
tutions. The moral case on behalf of animals is not stronger (though not weaker) than
other large-scale moral reforms. It relies on intuitions, negative arguments, extension
of existing moral convictions and sentiments, intensifying acknowledgment and per-
ception of suffering, and deconstructing attempts to preserve the status quo. It is not
a proof. Single-stage moves can guide reform in specific areas of animal welfare, and
this will be undertaken in the more detailed discussions in this topic.
