Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
Third, the neo-Kantian's distinction between being harmed and being wronged is it-
self misleading. True, examples such as warfare and self-defense show that entities
can be severely harmed without being wronged. But the requirement to justify the in-
fliction of harm indicates that harming is a prima facie wrong. Harm cannot thus be
cleanly divorced from moral components as the Kantian hopes. The Kantian will re-
tort that harm is a prima facie wrong only when directed at other humans. But this
claim flies in the face of widely shared agreement—exhibited in slaughter codes,
hunting norms, the “triple R” restriction on vivisection—according to which minimiz-
ing the harm done to animals is a goal that ought to be pursued. The obligation to
excuse inflicting harm does not seem to be species bound.
Fourth, the Kantian's appeal to a notion of humanity that one distorts if one is
cruel to animals seems to smuggle through the backdoor a tacit recognition that anim-
als can be wronged (rather than merely “harmed”). Why else should cruel acts make
for a flawed humanity if animals are morally neutral entities? Think of tables or
chairs. Such objects can be destroyed or damaged. Yet nothing one does to such ob-
jects indicates undesirable humanity. Aside from examples within environmental ethics,
we do not usually regard object-related conduct as potentially determining our human-
ity in a negative way. We would accordingly be puzzled to learn that animal-related
conduct was such a determining factor. Kant's talk of animal-related misconduct as
speaking poorly for us relies then on an implicit recognition within his readers, ac-
cording to which animals can be the subjects of immoral conduct.
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BEYOND TWO-STAGE THEORIES
Neo-Kantianism is indefensible. “Denying” animals “moral status” cannot be main-
tained. This does not mean that animals—or humans for that matter—“have” moral
status or that animal-related conduct reform needs to await the “establishment” of
moral status for them. Instead, the liberationist merely claims that some actions ought
not be done to animals. The reason for this restriction is that animals are entities that
can be harmed, and there is a moral obligation to avoid harming unless a solid justi-
fication is provided (for an unpacking of “solid,” see below). Single-stage thinking
absorbs from previous theorists the refutation of attempts to exclude animals from any
moral concern. Single-stage thinking also deploys the force of negative arguments
(without invoking rights): demanding specification of the property that animals lack
which could vindicate thwarting their interests in distinct ways. Finally, single-stage
thinking utilizes the utilitarian delineation of morally relevant properties (without ad-
opting an overall utilitarian approach). Given the inability to justifiably ostracize an-
imals from the pale of moral thought, no philosophical barrier prevents reforming
animal-related conduct: minimizing pain whenever possible, attempting to coexist with
animals in nonex-ploitative ways, and, in general, endorsing a hands-off approach.
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