WHY ANIMALS MATTER - Ethics and the Beast - page 22

wronged. I argued above that a reason-biased foundation for moral considerability pre-
supposes—rather than competes with—an experiential account: we regard reasoning
entities as morally significant because we also know that such beings can be affected
in ways that matter to them. I said that it is the ability to be harmed (rather than to
reason) that does the underlying moral work. Reasoning beings can be
harmed—“harm” covering more than negative experience, extending to various
deprivations that need not be experienced as losses—and since the capacity to be
harmed in these ways is a property that animals share too, moral conduct restrictions
ought to cover them. My neo-Kantian critic will now claim that my argument is be-
side the point: that I am misunderstanding the distinction between being harmed and
being wronged. The neo-Kantian agrees that humans and nonhumans can both be
harmed, but that only in humans can such harm be (sometimes) wrong, and this
uniqueness of humans stems from their particular capacity to reason in a certain way.
In arguing against this variant of neo-Kantianism I will avoid the empirical claims
within pro-animal literature that are designed to undermine the association of animals
with nonreasoning entities. 14 Nor will I revisit the conceptual difficulties of showing
that a distinguishing property (in our case, the capacity to reason in a highly articu-
late way) is also a (or the only) morally relevant one. Instead I wish to point out
some dubious implications of neo-Kantianism. First, by appealing to a kind-token
framework, the neo-Kantian cannot avoid endorsing an offending outlook regarding
mentally disabled human beings: these cannot be wronged by virtue of what they are,
but because they happen to belong to the right kind. The capacity of disabled indi-
viduals to be happy, be comfortable, experience severe pain, or have their interests
frustrated—all count for nothing. Such an implication would appall anyone who is fa-
miliar with such individuals or their families, or is concerned about developing a
moral and political philosophy that can adequately respond to and accommodate dis-
abled individuals rather than perceive them as having some derivative standing.
Second, neo-Kantianism implies the alarming thought that the moral status of us
humans is contingent upon our intellectual capacities; should these universally drop
(say that some unforeseen ecological factor will dramatically dumb down all humans),
we become morally free game. Suppose, for example, that humans retain some capa-
city for communication, some social organization, but no ability (actual or potential)
to read or write, not to mention an ability to understand Kant's moral writings. For
the neo-Kantian it would follow that for a race of moral aliens that would visit Earth
(“moral” in the sense that, unlike us humans, these aliens do understand and follow
Kantian morality, “follow” in the minimal sense of them endowing value to actions,
and realizing that moral prescriptions are universal), there will be no moral objection
preventing them from treating us in any way they like.