Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
part of a complete theory of such entitlement, and so this incompleteness need not
bother those who argue for ascribing moral status to animals.
EXCLUSION REVISITED
If two-stage thinking is wrong, why should we trouble over details that should only
matter to others? The reason relates not to status, but to unpacking the meaning of
“morally relevant properties,” a construction I left as an unanalyzed primitive above. I
denied that entities—human or nonhuman—“have” moral status. Instead, I claimed
that they possess morally relevant properties that, in turn, morally restrict what may
be done to them. I am accordingly obligated to elucidate what such properties are, as
well as to face the possibility that some of these properties (for instance, the capacity
to assent to moral rules or have linguistically formulated interests) are more important
than others (e.g., the capacity to undergo negative experiences).
We can afford to leave unaddressed the latter possibility since relative importance
of morally relevant properties does not affect any of the practical conclusions that
this topic advances. As for explaining what “morally relevant property” means, I can
do no better than give a circular answer: P is a morally relevant property, if and only
if the possession of P by entity E calls for moral restrictions on actions that concern
E. The philosophically interesting question is why some properties are grouped togeth-
er as morally relevant while others are not. I do not know of good answers to this
appears that all of the known proposed contenders for morally relevant properties
have
either focused on or presupposed
the capacity for negative experience. This sug-
gests that the capacity for negative experience either underlies other properties that
because of it become morally relevant, or plays a different decisive role in the core
perceptions that guide our moral relations with others. The precise role of the capa-
city for negative experience in determining moral relevancy can be left open. It is
sufficient to recognize that the role is a central one, and that animals clearly exempli-
fy this capacity.
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Going beyond two-stage thinking involves revising two-stage arguments into one-
stage negative ones. For example, avoiding causing unnecessary suffering cannot be
limited to human suffering. What moral reason can prevent extending the disinclina-
tion to create pain to suffering beings that, let us suppose, do not have rights, or
have inferior cognitive and emotional capacities? Many aspects of pro-animal reform
can be integrated into similar questions without establishing a positive case for moral
considerability. Exploitation, killing (painless or not), or severe limitation of move-
ment is either ruled out or requires extraordinary vindications when applied to human
animals. Why should such limitations disappear when considering animals? These are
