WHY ANIMALS MATTER - Ethics and the Beast - page 17

cannot suffice on its own (intelligent aliens obviously call for moral defense, and this
shows that species membership is parasitical upon other morally relevant properties, in
this case intelligence). Yet (the rights argument proceeds), humans with severe mental
disabilities can be cognitively and emotionally inferior to some animals. Ergo, if the
latter properties guarantee rights, humans cannot be the only ones who justifiably pos-
sess them.
Appealing to rights can constitute, in this sense, a “negative” case for moral con-
siderability: it will not clarify the positive basis for bestowing rights but will expose
the lack of a defensible principle for exclusion. The argument did not state or rely on
intelligence being a morally relevant property. It merely placed the burden of proof
on opponents of the animal case, challenging them to specify a property that humans
exclusively possess, that can justify excluding rights to animals. After showing that
species membership cannot suffice, the animal advocate eliminates possible candidates
(such as the possession of intelligence) that can potentially vindicate the exclusion of
animals. Rights-talk can consequently function as a roundabout tool through which
moral considerability is established.

3

By contrast, positive arguments for moral inclusion delineate and defend specific
morally relevant properties. Pro-animal utilitarians, for example, contend that the capa-
city to suffer makes animals worthy of direct moral concern. Alternatively, for Bern-
ard Rollin, having things matter to an entity is a sufficient condition for inclusion.
These answers are interconnected: if a being suffers, then things matter to it (minim-
ally, the avoidance of pain matters to it, that is, the being is not indifferent to pain).
Similarly, possessing interests seems inseparable from some relationship with pain/
pleasure. 4 From a liberationist perspective, Rollin's answer is somewhat more inclus-
ive than the hedonic utilitarian variant, since it covers behavior of animals such as
fish and crabs, in which some have doubted the existence of pain. 5 Moreover, when
mobilizing reform, Rollin's underscoring of interests (rather than pain alone) entails
opposing not only practices that induce pain, but also practices involving significant
thwarting of the interests of animals, a difference that will become more significant
later in this topic. Notwithstanding these differences, the Rollin-Bentham view on
moral standing is intuitive: entities that care about what happens to them, even when
such care is nonlinguistic, are obvious candidates for inclusion. This view also clari-
fies why actions directed at animals differ from those done to vegetables or inanimate
objects (or, for that matter, bacteria), thereby distinguishing animal ethics from other
ecological moral concerns.
For all its immediate appeal, the Rollin-Bentham view can be challenged, as Frey
did, through asking for its argumentative support. What argument, Frey asks, can sub-
stantiate the idea that when things matter to an entity, it is worthy of moral consider-