Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
age between superiority and trumping interests, a connection that is there all the
same. Put another way, the examples prove that we are willing to refrain from advan-
cing the interests of entities that we value more when these clash with very strong
attachments and commitments we have to particular people. In the case of nonhuman
animals, however, such attachments are beside the point. We not only disvalue them
relative to humans, but we have no real reason to abandon our predilection to favor
interests of the more valuable entities, namely, ourselves. Our conclusion should have
been that, all things being (in some undefined sense) equal, if A is superior to B, A's
interests should be preferred. In the context of defining speciesism, we thus reach the
following:
Speciesism (2): Humans are more important than nonhumans because they are hu-
mans, and therefore, all things being equal, their interests should be preferred.
Let us avoid harping on the vagueness of “importance” and “all things being
equal” or pressurizing the “because they are human” clause (this last construction be-
ing a favorite target of liberationists). Considerations going back at least to Plato's
Gorgias
will show that this definition, even if the central operators in it can be un-
packed in a credible way, is still insufficient in generating antiliberationism.
Suppose that I am having A and B to dinner, and that all of us, including B, re-
cognize A's superiority over B and myself (say that A has just received a Nobel Pr-
ize, and that B and myself wholeheartedly believe that this constitutes a reason to re-
gard him as categorically superior in value to us). Moreover, we all agree that this
means that “all things being equal,” A's interests ought to take priority over our own.
The vagueness in (2) relates to the inability to stipulate credible links between such
beliefs and
particular
decisions regarding specific clashes of interests. For example,
should A receive larger portions of food because of his relative importance? Should
he have the last slice of pie, which all of us have been coveting, due to his senior-
ity? Should he be the one that gets to determine the temperature level of the air con-
ditioning system? The sense of ridicule stems not only from our inability to seriously
fathom the idea that one human being is superior to another, but from the intrinsic
improbability of meticulously tying greater value and consequent belief in trumping
interests with
specific
entitlements. Even if all three of us agree both that A is super-
ior and that this should entail
some
kind of promotion of his interests over our own,
this admission does not tie up neatly to favoritism of a
particular
kind.
Noting the lacuna between some general favoritism and particular entitlements is
important. Liberationists can endorse the second version of speciesism above, accept-
ing both the idea that humans are more important as well as the idea that human in-
terests come first, yet, because this definition does not determine
which
animal in-
terests should be disfavored, add that accepting such beliefs still coheres with abolish-
