Biology Reference
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other, a difference that underlies a broader and more comprehensive rejection of zoos
(a rejection that, incidentally, makes it unnecessary to introduce a finer distinction
between severe and mild restriction of movement). The relevant difference relates to
paternalism and to the very act of placing animals in captivity. As suggested earlier,
permanent paternalistic relations among healthy human beings are by definition im-
moral. In the case of (some) nonhuman animals, paternalism is accepted as justified
by most liberationists. This difference accounts for our predilection to regard impris-
oning humans for their own good as sophistry, and at the same time allowing this
very same argument to carry considerable weight when it comes to limiting move-
ment of nonhuman animals. The moral justification for such favoritism regarding pa-
ternalism appeals to the overall good of these animals: farm animals and numerous
companion animals owe their existence to the decision of human beings to place
them in such permanent paternalistic relations, and this can be done without abusing
or exploiting them. Yet unlike cows, pigs, hens, or sheep, zoo animals such as tigers,
elephants, snakes, penguins, zebras, parrots, and other crowd pullers all live outside
human supervision and do so successfully. They might, as Bostock says, live longer
in a zoo, and lead an overall healthier life. But unlike farm animals, the existence of
such animals does not depend on human action. If we avoid hunting them down or
destroying their ecosystems they can survive. Placing them inside cages is accordingly
not in their interests. In the rare cases in which it is (e.g., wounded animals or an
endangered species), captivity can be considered a good only if it is conceived as a
temporary stage, preparatory for the eventual release of the animal.
To conclude: a welfare-based paternalism with regard to zoo animals is ill-founded.
Bostock's defense of zoos—which is predicated on such paternalism—is to be rejec-
ted.
TWO OBJECTIONS
Here are two objections to what I have just said:
1. Paternalism with regards to animals is always wrong, whether it relates to com-
panion animals, farm animals, or zoo animals. Accordingly, my attempt to set a
meaningful difference between justified and unjustified paternalism is questionable and
self-serving: animals are better off the more freedom they have. I do not need to re-
spond to this objection since, in the context of zoos, this argument involves dismiss-
ing the moral legitimacy of zoos and does not oppose my general conclusion.
2
2. If I am granting that some version of paternalism is credible with regard to farm
animals, I cannot bar plausible extensions of such justifications to zoo animals.
In detail, the counterargument in (2) is this: when justifying keeping farm animals,
I allowed that being brought into a qualitatively good existence is an overall good for
 
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