Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
In human contexts we readily acknowledge that cruelty need not necessarily relate to
the creation of pain. Some eventualities are envisioned as a horrifying prospect while,
if occurring, they might not be experienced as painful at all. Consider coma. Creating
such a state in another is surely cruel. A gruesome example would be inducing a hu-
man baby into permanent coma. Setting aside the suffering of those related to the
baby or those hearing of the horrifying deed (for the sake of the argument, assume
that the baby is unrelated to anyone, and that no one will learn of its fate), such
could constitute an innocuous act according to Bostock's stipulations, merely because
it does not generate suffering.
AGAINST THE WELFARE DEFENSE OF ZOOS
Analogies such as these are precarious. Notwithstanding the overlap between abus-
ing humans and maltreating animals, the important dissimilarities between humans and
nonhumans call for a species-sensitive understanding of cruelty. Can Bostock plausibly
dismiss the above counter example to his claim, based on an alleged disanalogy
between humans and nonhumans?
Although we need to develop a refined species-sensitive understanding of cruelty, I
cannot envision a defensible rendering of it that would help Bostock. His understand-
ing of cruelty is much too narrow. Unjustifiably inducing coma in a young giraffe or
a buffalo is an instance of (painless) cruelty because it is a severe form of depriva-
tion. Like the human baby, the lack of awareness or experience of this deprivation
does not purge the act. The severe limiting of movement that zoos rely on is argu-
ably a
worse
form of deprivation because, for many animals, it is experienced as
such (behavioral problems and the disinclination to breed in captivity suggest this). To
begin with, Bostock would accordingly have to broaden his definition of cruelty so
that it would include deprivation. Fine-tuning “deprivation” so that it would be a
species-sensitive moral operator is surely important. Yet for our purposes we may
leave it vague: deprivation would minimally include action such as severe restriction
of movement. This stipulation alone would rule out many of the animal exhibits that
we see in our zoos. For, while a species-sensitive unpacking of “severe restriction of
movement” would not entail that nonhuman animals require unlimited freedom of
movement (human beings do not possess unlimited freedom of movement either), an-
imals such as primates, the larger predators, birds, and many others are “severely” re-
stricted in movement in our zoos. They are being unnecessarily deprived. We are be-
ing cruel.
Can Bostock modify his claims so that his defense of zoos would pertain only to
those animals that are
mildly
deprived by their captivity? He cannot. This is due to a
difference between farm/companion animals on the one hand, and zoo animals on the
