Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
Chapter 8
RECREATIONAL USE
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN use and exploitation underlies this section of the
topic and is a cardinal one for any comprehensive moral outlook on our relations with
nonhuman animals. It is possible to map onto the use/exploitation opposition the three
diverging perspectives in debates over animals that are under human supervision: (1)
animals are never exploited—merely used; (2) animals are never used—always ex-
ploited; (3) some animals are used by humans while others are exploited by them. The
first position holds that by virtue of what they are, nonhuman animals can never be
exploited (or, what boils down to the same: they can be exploited, but such exploita-
tion is not morally problematic). The second group perceives any self-serving relation-
ship with animals as exploitative, even when it significantly promotes the interests of
animals in such relationships. This position prescribes moral veganism and opposes
maintaining companion animals. The third group does not rule out all animal-related
practices yet is willing to abrogate some of them, if they constitute exploitation.
This topic advocates the perspective of the third group. I find its outlook attractive,
since it accommodates the possibility that some human-animal relations can be morally
blameless. Such relationships benefit both humans and nonhumans and can potentially
be vindicated when generalized into large-scale practices. The other advantage of (3) is
that it also facilitates the recognition that nonhuman animals may be exploited, and
that animal-related practices can be morally wrong even if they do not involve palp-
able cruelty and suffering. For both these reasons, should it prevail, (3) will substan-
tially improve the overall lot of animals. And (3) is also a less radical stance than the
one adopted by the second group, making it strategically more feasible by enabling
liberationism to appeal to a larger consensus. Some may also find it to be ecologically
more responsible than its more radical alternatives.
The problem for endorsers of (3)—call them “moderate liberationists”— is how to
avoid a programmatic stance that lacks substantial coordinates able to successfully dif-
ferentiate exploitation from use. The challenge relates first to clarifying the conceptual
distinction between use and exploitation as such; second, to showing how this distinc-
tion pertains to nonhuman animals; and third, to applying this distinction to actual
animal-related practices, respecting their particular nature and the conduct they involve
and, in particular, how these practices might be advancing the interests of some anim-
als. The implications of such clarification are far reaching, relating to what we eat,
wear, or regard as entertainment. Previously in this topic, I evaluated the practice of
using farm animals, as well as the practice of using animals as therapeutic means. In
