Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
covert decision-making and the blight and confusion that is often the consequence of
a fully public process. The large number of possible site options is to be gradually
reduced to three or four feasible packages through a process of four sifts. The even-
tual optional packages may consist of combinations of the previously considered sin-
gle options. The team of government ministers will decide which schemes to carry
forward to the next sift against a set of pre-determined objectives. The ministers will
generate the weightings to be applied to the objectives. They will be assisted by two
panels. One of the panels meets approximately monthly, consists of government offi-
cials and experts who advise the study, and has access to all pertinent information.
The other panel meets less frequently, has a broader representation of interested par-
ties, and does not share in the site-specific information. This reduces the possibility
of needless scare stories causing local blight. The final packages will include a range
of possible solutions, from a 'do nothing' option to a new mega-airport; the other
packages have capacities between these two extremes. Once they are chosen, there
will be full public consultation on these packages, the feedback being a vital element
in determining government policy.
The SERAS appraisal framework deliberately has little to say about how to bal-
ance the interests of the various parties, either between environmental and economic
objectives, between the different societal groups or between national and local inter-
ests. The weighting between these interests is still being left to ministers who will take
on board the views of the officials and members of the advisory committees, augmented
by public consultation in the last stage of the sifting of packages. It is expected that ini-
tiatives will also be taken within the planning process to allow a fairer balance to be
struck through new forms of compensation, perhaps through local tax relief, cross
transfer of taxes between jurisdictions, hypothecated noise charges or private deals.
Financial compensation
There is seldom an equal distribution of costs and benefits. In an ideal market econ-
omy, the price of transport would determine not only how each mode would be used
but also how much travel was beneficial for society at large. In other words, the full
social costs imposed by each unit of travel would be reflected in the cost of travel. It
ought, in theory, to be possible to recycle the social costs of pollution. Some options
are described by Grayling and Bishop (2001); but none of them is easy. Market
forces operate with a decision rule that one dollar equates to one vote, while democ-
racy operates on the basis that one person equates to one vote (Flyvbjerg, 1984). So,
even if the price of transport accurately reflected the true long-term value of resources
used, principles of social justice would still require additional judgements to be
made. Ultimately, these judgements are made through the political process, but the
judgements should be well informed.
An option for approaching the problem, if a fair market price can be established,
is for the airport to buy out the property in the same way as would happen in the UK
if a compulsory purchase order were to be obtained, with compensation for moving
in compliance with the Land Compensation Act, 1973. British Rail offered to do this
for properties within a 240 metre (m) wide corridor around the channel tunnel rail
link in negotiation with Kent County Council, though it appears that the Department
for Transport (DfT) is only prepared to allow up to UK£5000 as an additional 'solace'
