Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
samples were presented at international meetings with little or no notification
to the Indonesian government; and papers based on the use of the samples were
written without genuine opportunities to include local collaborators as co-authors
(Sedyaningsih et al.
2008
: 485). This was in contravention of the WHO's own
policy, published in March 2005, regarding the sharing of influenza viruses or
specimens with the potential to cause human influenza pandemics, which stated
that 'the designated WHO Reference Laboratories will seek permission from the
originating country/laboratory to coauthor and/or publish results obtained from the
analyses of relevant viruses/samples', and that there 'will be no further distribution
of viruses/specimens outside the network of WHO Reference Laboratories without
permission from the originating country/laboratory' (WHO
2005a
).
Subsequent reports confirmed that members of the WHO Global Influenza
Surveillance Network (GISN) routinely shared information derived from virus
specimens with firms that were outside of the network, and that some GISN mem-
ber institutions and private firms filed patent applications using that information
(Hammond
2009
; WIPO
2007
; Sedyaningsih et al.
2008
: 486). Indonesian officials
argued that allowing pharmaceutical companies (who were not members of the
WHO) to have access to the Indonesian samples was not only (again) in contraven-
tion of the WHO's policy regarding virus sharing, but also an indication of the grave
unfairness of the system. As Endang R. Sedyaningsih et al. (
2008
: 486). put it:
Disease affected countries, which are usually developing countries, provide information
and share biological specimens/virus with the WHO system; then pharmaceutical indus-
tries of developed countries obtain free access to this information and specimens, produce
and patent the products (diagnostics, vaccines, therapeutics or other technologies), and
sell them back to the developing countries at unaffordable prices. Although it is general
knowledge that this practice has been going on for a long time for other major communi-
cable diseases - not just for avian influenza - the fear of potential pandemic influenza has
magnified this gap.
Following Indonesia's decision to stop sending samples, the policy that per-
mission should be sought prior to distributing any samples to entities outside
of the WHO was overridden by the WHO's executive board meeting in January
2007. The new WHO recommendation stressed countries' responsibility to
share their specimens or viruses without imposing 'agreements or adminis-
trative procedures that may inhibit the proper functioning of the WHO GISN,
including in particular the timely sharing of material and information and the
achievement of the Network's objectives' (Sedyaningsih et al.
2008
: 486; WHO
2007b
).
Appealing to all members of the WHO in 2007, the organization's director-
general, Margaret Chan, said that cooperation was crucial to combating a pan-
demic: 'International public health security is both a collective aspiration and a
mutual responsibility' (WHO
2007c
: 3). Referring to its specific situation, the
Indonesian government noted that the CBD gave sovereignty over biological
resources to national governments, a principle which they upheld on behalf of
their populations, and that national law required a standard material transfer
