Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
Perhaps Spykman's most telling observation concerns Europe. Just as he is opposed to
both German and Russian domination of Europe, he is also opposed to a united Europe
under any circumstances. He prefers a balance of power among states within Europe as
more advantageous to American interests than a European federation, even were it to come
about peacefully and democratically. “A federal Europe,” he writes, “would constitute an
agglomeration of force that would completely alter our significance as an Atlantic power
and greatly weaken our position in the Western Hemisphere.” Because the European Union
is still in an intermediate phase of development, with strong national leaders pursuing co-
ordinated, yet ultimately independent, foreign policies, despite the creation of a single cur-
rency zone, it is too soon to pass judgment on Spykman's prediction. Yet already one can
see that the more united Europe becomes, the greater its tensions with the United States.
A true European super-state with armed forces and a single foreign policy at its command
would be both a staunch competitor of the U.S., and possibly the dominant outside power
in the equidistant zone of southern South America. 15 (Of course, Europe's current financial
crisis make this prospect doubtful.)
Here is where Spykman differs markedly from Mackinder and Cold War containment
policy. 16 Containment policy, which encouraged a united Europe as a bulwark against
Soviet communism, was rooted in the liberal ideals of a free society as well as in geopol-
itics. George Kennan, when he wrote the Long Telegram, put his faith in the Western way
of life, which he believed would outlast the totalitarian strictures of Soviet communism.
It followed, therefore, that like-minded democratic European states were to be encouraged
in their efforts toward a common political and economic union. Spykman, though, is even
more cold-blooded than Kennan—himself a hardcore realist. Spykman will simply not let
any elements outside of geographical ones enter into his analysis. Unlike Haushofer, it is
not that he doesn't believe in democracy and a free society: rather, it is that he does not feel
the existence of it has much of a role in geopolitical analysis. Spykman sees his job not as
improving the world, but in saying what he thinks is going on in it. It is this very ice-in-his-
veins sensibility that permits him to see beyond Kennan and the Cold War. Thus, in 1942
he can still write about today:
Only statesmen who can do their political and strategic thinking in terms of a
round earth and a three-dimensional warfare can save their countries from being
outmaneuvered on distant flanks. With air power supplementing sea power and
mobility again the essence of warfare, no region of the globe is too distant to be
without strategic significance, too remote to be neglected in the calculations of
power politics. 17
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