HERODOTUS AND HIS SUCCESSORS - The Revenge of Geography - page 31

plain had been made to flourish,” the result of a gently sloping landscape in the lower part
of the Tigris-Euphrates valley that carried irrigation water for miles, “they became tempt-
ing objects of plunder to the barbarous peoples of the country round about.” Moreover,
when most of the irrigable land of Mesopotamia came under cultivation, and the fields of
one community came into contact with those of another, chronic war emerged, as there was
no central authority to settle boundary disputes, or to apportion water in times of shortage.
In the midst of this semi-chaos, conquerors like Sargon (2400 B.C .) entered Mesopotamia
from the margins of the cultivated zone. Though able to establish a centralized authority,
the vanquishing soldiery, after a few generations, McNeill tells us, gave up the military life
in favor of the “softer and more luxurious ways” of the towns. And so history began to re-
peat itself with the arrival of new conquerors.
This is all very reminiscent of the pattern described by the fourteenth-century Tunisian
historian and geographer Ibn Khaldun, who notes that while luxurious living strengthens
the state initially by furthering its legitimacy, in succeeding generations it leads to dec-
adence, with the process of collapse signaled by the rise of powerful provincial leaders,
who then invade and form their own dynasties. 3 Ultimately, the rise of civilization in an-
cient Iraq led to the most suffocating of tyrannies in order to stave off the disintegration
from within: thus we have Tiglath-pileser (twelfth-eleventh centuries B.C .), Ashurnasirpal
II (ninth century B.C .), Sennacherib (eighth-seventh centuries B.C .), and others, famous for
their cruelty, megalomania, and mass deportations carried out in their name. 4 It is a pat-
tern that culminates in Saddam Hussein: that of a region prone to invasion and fragment-
ation that required through much of history significant levels of tyranny. But again, one
should avoid too constricted a conclusion: for example, between 1921 and 1958, Iraq ex-
perienced a modestly well-functioning parliamentary system, which might have continued
under slightly altered circumstances. McNeill, Khaldun, and Stark are speaking of historic-
al and geographical tendencies only, and thus avoid the charge of determinism. 5
Just as geography formed the basis for an extraordinary level of tyranny and bureaucracy
in Mesopotamia, McNeill explains how it culminated in somewhat less oppressive rule in
Egypt. “Deserts gave the land of Egypt clear-cut and easily defensible boundaries; while
the Nile provided it with a natural backbone and nervous system,” so that Mesopotami-
an levels of oppression weren't necessary along the Nile. “Frontier defense,” he goes on,
“against outlanders was scarcely a serious problem for the king of Egypt”: indeed, because
of Egypt's favorable situation vis-à-vis migration routes compared to Mesopotamia's, in-
filtration by Libyans from the west and Asiatics from the east were relatively minor issues.
Egypt was shut off from the south, where there is nothing but bare desert on either side of
the river; while in the north there is the Mediterranean Sea. It is probable that for four thou-
sand years Egyptians “never saw an invading host in their midst.” 6 The Nile, moreover,
was easily navigable, with the flow of the river carrying boats northward, even as the winds