Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
Israeli soldier, takes no prisoners in his belief that China will be America's primary milit-
ary adversary, a belief that Mearsheimer also shares. They both, along with Pillar, a former
CIA analyst, remain in high dudgeon about the diversion of American resources to useless
wars in the Middle East while China acquires the latest defense technology. Indeed, even if
we do stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan, China will be the main beneficiary, able to build
roads and pipelines throughout the region as part of its quest for energy and strategic min-
erals and metals. Meanwhile, Carpenter warns severely about the danger that a violence-
plagued Mexico represents; as did Huntington in his last years. To merge their thoughts, as
well as those of others I could name, all of whom dwell more or less in the realist camp
of foreign policy circles, is to reach the conclusion that America faces three primary geo-
political dilemmas: a chaotic Eurasian heartland in the Middle East, a rising and assertive
Chinese superpower, and a state in deep trouble in Mexico. And the challenges we face
with China and Mexico are most efficiently dealt with by wariness of further military in-
volvement in the Middle East. This is the only way that American power can sustain itself
for the decades to come, and survive part of the
longue durée
.
Of course, there is safety, a certain smugness for that matter, in such long-term thinking.
None of these men has adequately addressed what, for instance, would actually happen
if we were to withdraw precipitously, say, from Afghanistan. Would the intelligence that
has led to successful drone attacks on al Qaeda in Waziristan dry up? Would Ayman al-
Zawahiri and other surviving luminaries of al Qaeda make triumphal entries in front of
al Jazeera television cameras into Jalalabad? Would Afghanistan become a radicalized
Taliban state under the tutelage of Pakistani intelligence? Would India, the global pivot
state of the twenty-first century, lose respect for the United States as a consequence? Would
Iran informally annex western Afghanistan? And what would have happened to Iraq had
we withdrawn completely in 2006, at the height of the violence there, as some of these ana-
lysts would have no doubt wished? Would the Balkan-level sectarian atrocities have soared
to the level of Rwanda, with a million killed rather than a hundred or two hundred thou-
sand? For one would have to be particularly cold-blooded not to realize the monumental
effect on individual lives in such different outcomes. Moreover, what would have happened
in the region, and to America's reputation for power, had we so withdrawn? How would
such quick withdrawals be carried out? Don't ever say that things cannot get much worse
than they are, because they can.
Truly, withdrawing precipitously from Iraq or Afghanistan would be irresponsible be-
cause—like it or not—merely by invading these places and staying there so long, we have
acquired substantial stakes in the outcomes. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to judge these
analysts and others who agree with them solely on the minutiae of Iraq and Afghanistan.
For the wellspring of emotion behind their beliefs is that we never should have gotten in-
volved in these countries in the first place. No matter how Iraq eventually turns out, the
