Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
somewhat on the First Island Chain, even as American ships and planes continue to patrol
it, in and out of China's anti-access bubble. Meanwhile, the plan envisages a dramatic ex-
pansion of American naval activity in the Indian Ocean. To achieve this, the United States
would not have hardened bases, but rather austere “operating locations” and defense agree-
ments in Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia; and on island nations scattered about the Indian
Ocean, such as the Comoros, Seychelles, Mauritius, Reunion, Maldives, and Andamans, a
number of which are managed directly or indirectly by France and India, both U.S. allies.
This sustains the freedom of navigation in Eurasia along with unimpeded energy flows. The
plan deemphasizes existing American bases in Japan and South Korea, and diversifies the
U.S. footprint around Oceania to replace the overwhelming stress on Guam, thus moving
away from easily targeted “master” bases. For in an age of prickly sovereignty, defended
by volatile mass medias, hardening foreign bases make them politically indigestible to loc-
al populations. Guam, as a U.S. territory, is the exception that proves the rule. The United
States experienced such difficulty with the use of its bases in Turkey prior to the Iraq War
in 2003, and for a short time with the use of bases in Japan in 2010. The American Army
presence in South Korea is now less embattled mainly because the number of troops sta-
tioned there has dropped from 38,000 to 25,000 in recent years, while downtown Seoul has
largely been abandoned by the U.S. military.
In any case, the American hold on the First Island Chain is beginning to be pried loose.
Local populations are less agreeable to foreign bases, even as a rising China serves as both
an intimidator and attractor that can complicate America's bilateral relations with its Pacif-
ic allies. It is about time that this is happening. To wit, the 2009-2010 crisis in American-
Japanese relations, with an inexperienced new Japanese government wanting to rewrite the
rules of the bilateral relationship in Tokyo's favor, even as it talked of developing deeper
ties with China, should have occurred years before. The paramount American position in
the Pacific is an outdated legacy of World War II, which left China, Japan, and the Philip-
pines devastated: nor can the division of Korea, a product of fighting that ended six decades
ago, and left the U.S. military with a dominant position on the peninsula, last forever.
Meanwhile, a Greater China is emerging politically and economically in Central-East
Asia and in the Western Pacific, with a significant naval dimension in the East and South
China seas, while at the same time Beijing is involved in port-building projects and arms
transfers on the Indian Ocean littoral. Only substantial political and economic turmoil in-
side China could alter this trend. But just outside the borders of this new power realm will
likely be a stream of American warships, perhaps headquartered in many cases in Oceania,
and partnered with warships from India, Japan, and other democracies, all of whom can-
not resist the Chinese embrace, but at the same time are forced to balance against it. Given
time, a Chinese blue-water force could become less territorial as it grows in confidence,
and thus be drawn into this very alliance structure. Moreover, as political scientist Robert
S. Ross points out in a 1999 article that is as relevant now as it was then, because of the
