THE GEOGRAPHY OF CHINESE POWER - The Revenge of Geography - page 161

graphic bottlenecks of the various Indonesian straits (Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Ma-
cassar), through which a large proportion of China's oil tankers and merchant fleet must
pass. There are also significant deposits of oil and gas that China hopes to exploit, making
the South China Sea a “second Persian Gulf” in some estimations, write Naval War College
professors Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein. 50 Spykman noted that throughout history
states have engaged in “circumferential and transmarine expansion” to gain control of adja-
cent seas: Greece sought to control the Aegean, Rome the Mediterranean, the United States
the Caribbean, and now, according to this logic, China the South China Sea. 51 Indeed, the
South China Sea with the Strait of Malacca unlocks the Indian Ocean for China the same
way control over the Caribbean unlocked the Pacific for America at the time of the build-
ing of the Panama Canal. 52 And just as Spykman called the Greater Caribbean—in order
to underscore its importance—the “American Mediterranean,” we can call the South China
Sea the Asian Mediterranean , since it will be at the heart of political geography in com-
ing decades. 53 China may seek to dominate the South China Sea in a similar way that the
Americans dominated the Caribbean, while America, playing by different rules now, will
seek along with allies like Vietnam and the Philippines to keep it a full-fledged internation-
al waterway. It is fear of China—not love of America—that is driving Hanoi into Washing-
ton's arms. Given the history of the Vietnam War, it may seem disorienting to witness this
emerging relationship between two erstwhile enemies; but consider the fact that precisely
by defeating America in a war means Vietnam is a confident country with no chip on its
shoulder, and thus psychologically free to enter into an undeclared alliance with the United
States.
China is using all forms of its national power—political, diplomatic, economic, commer-
cial, military, and demographic—to expand virtually beyond its legal land and sea borders
in order to encompass the borders of imperial China at its historical high points. Yet there
is a contradiction here. Let me explain.
As I've indicated, China is intent on access denial in its coastal seas. In fact, scholars
Andrew Erickson and David Yang suggest “the possibility that China may be closer than
ever to mastering” the ability to hit a moving target at sea, such as a U.S. carrier, with a
land-based missile, and may plan a “strategically publicized test sometime in the future.” 54
But access denial without the ability to protect its own sea lines of communication makes
an attack on an American surface combatant (let alone a naval war with the United States)
futile, since the U.S. Navy would maintain the ability to cut off Chinese energy supplies by
interdicting Chinese ships in the Pacific and Indian oceans. Of course, the Chinese seek to
influence American behavior, rather than ever fight the United States outright. Still, why