Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
I believe, will not only be determined by such bilateral and global issues as trade, debt, cli-
mate change, and human rights, but more importantly by the specific geography of China's
potential sphere of influence in maritime Asia.
Pivotal to that sphere of influence is the future of Taiwan. Taiwan illustrates something
basic in world politics: that moral questions are, just beneath the surface, often questions of
power. Taiwan is often discussed in moral terms, even as its sovereignty or lack thereof car-
ries pivotal geopolitical consequences. China talks about Taiwan in terms of consolidating
the national patrimony, unifying China for the good of all ethnic Chinese. America talks
about Taiwan in terms of preserving a model democracy. But Taiwan is something else: in
Army general Douglas MacArthur's words, it is “an unsinkable aircraft carrier” that dom-
inates the center point of China's convex seaboard, from which an outside power like the
United States can “radiate” power along China's coastal periphery, according to Holmes
Taiwanese independence. Of all the guard towers along the reverse maritime Great Wall,
Taiwan is, metaphorically, the tallest and most centrally located. With Taiwan returned to
the bosom of mainland China, suddenly the Great Wall and the maritime strait-jacket it rep-
resents would be severed. If China succeeds in consolidating Taiwan, not only will its navy
suddenly be in an advantageous strategic position vis-à-vis the First Island Chain, but its
national energies, especially its military ones, will be just as dramatically freed up to look
outward in terms of power projection, to a degree that has so far been impossible. Though
the adjective “multipolar” is thrown around liberally to describe the global situation, it will
be the virtual fusing of Taiwan with the mainland that will mark in a military sense the real
emergence of a multipolar world.
According to a 2009 RAND study, the United States will not be able to defend Taiwan
from Chinese attack by 2020. China is ready with cyber-weapons, an air force replete with
new fourth-generation fighter jets, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and thousands
of missiles on the mainland targeting both Taiwan and Taiwan's own fighter jets on the
ground. The Chinese, according to the report, defeat the U.S. with or without F-22s, with
or without the use of Kadena Air Base in Japan, and with or without the use of two carrier
strike groups. The RAND report emphasizes the air battle. The Chinese would still have to
land tens of thousands of troops by sea and would be susceptible to U.S. submarines. Yet
the report, with all its caveats, does highlight a disturbing trend. China is just a hundred
miles away, but the United States must project military power from half a world away in a
Post Cold War environment in which it can less and less depend on the use of foreign bases.
China's anti-access naval strategy is not only designed to keep out U.S. forces in a general
way, but to ease the conquest of Taiwan in a specific way. The Chinese military can focus
more intensely on Taiwan than can America's, given all of America's global responsibil-
