Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
But while Eurasia may become an ever more useful concept for geographers and geopoliti-
cians in the coming years, that doesn't mean that Georgians, Armenians, or Uzbeks, with
all the historical and emotional baggage that goes with such ethnic identities, will begin to
think of themselves as “Eurasians.” The Caucasus are the Caucasus precisely because they
are a cauldron of ethnic identities and conflicts: identities that with the collapse of Cold
War power blocs have the potential to become even more richly developed. The same holds
true to a large extent for Central Asia. Even if Russians and, say, Kazakhs can suppress
their ethnic rivalry through a “Eurasian Union” of sorts, Eurasianism does not appear to be
something that people will die for; or something that will send a chill up their spine; espe-
cially as Ukrainians, Moldovans, Georgians, and others pine to be Europeans. But if Eur-
asianism can suppress differences however slightly in some quarters of the former Soviet
Union, and therefore help stability, is it not worthwhile in its own right?
Just as geography is not an explanation for everything, neither is it a solution. Geography
is merely the unchanging backdrop against which the battle of ideas plays out. Even when
geography is a unifier—as in the case of America or Great Britain, or India or Israel—the
ideals of democracy and liberty and Zionism (with its spiritual element) have, nevertheless,
been basic to national identity. And when a people have nothing else to unite them except
geography, as in the case of Egypt under former dictator Hosni Mubarak or Japan under the
former ruling Liberal Democratic Party, then the state is afflicted by an overpowering mal-
aise: stable it may be, thanks to geography, but that is all. Thus Russia, shorn of czardom
and communism, requires an uplifting, unifying ideal beyond geography if it is to succeed
in attracting back former subject peoples, particularly at a time when its own meager pop-
ulation is rapidly diminishing. Indeed, because of low birth rates, high death rates, a high
rate of abortion, and low immigration, Russia's population of 141 million may drop to 111
million by 2050. (Accelerating this are the toxic levels of water and soil pollution, as part
of a general environmental degradation.) Meanwhile, Russia's nominal Muslim community
is increasing and may make up as much as 20 percent of the country's population with-
in a decade, even as it is based in the north Caucasus and the Volga-Ural area, as well as
in Moscow and St. Petersburg, so that it has a tendency toward regional separatism, while
also possessing the ability to engage in urban terrorism. Chechen women have more than
a third as many children as their Russian counterparts. To be sure, a mere appeal to geo-
graphy—which is really what Eurasianism and the attendant Commonwealth of Independ-
ent States are about—will probably not allow for the rebirth of a Russian empire to compete
with Kievan Rus, medieval Muscovy, the Romanov dynasty, and the Soviet Union.
Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, argues that in the twenty-first
century, “the power of attraction trumps that of coercion,” and, therefore, “Soft power
should be central to Russia's foreign policy.” In other words, a truly reformed Russia would
be in a better position to project influence throughout its Eurasian peripheries. For the Rus-
sian language is the lingua franca from the Baltics to Central Asia, and Russian culture,
