THE ALLURE OF SEA POWER - The Revenge of Geography - page 85

In a sign of how the power dynamics of the world are changing, Indian and Chinese
strategists avidly read Mahan; they, much more than the Americans, are the Mahanians
now: they are building fleets designed for armed encounters at sea, whereas European
navies view sea power only in terms of constabulary action. For example, in a 2004 sym-
posium in Beijing, “scholar after scholar quoted Mahan … attesting to his influence,” write
Naval War College professors James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara. “And almost without
exception, they quoted the most bellicose-sounding of Mahan's precepts, equating com-
mand of the sea to overbearing power that closes the maritime common to an enemy's
flag.” 12 Since then, as the Chinese navy becomes larger and more wide-ranging, the bent
toward Mahan has only intensified in Beijing, especially with the rise of Indian sea power,
which the Chinese fear; the Indians, for their part, view the Chinese in similar Mahanian
terms. The American Navy, meanwhile, appears to have embraced another theorist. Let me
explain.
Julian Corbett, a British historian of the same era, did not so much disagree with Mahan
as offer a subtler approach to naval strategy, placing greater emphasis on doing more at sea
with fewer ships. Corbett asserts that just because one nation has lost control of the sea, an-
other nation has not necessarily gained it (as Mahan believed). A naval coalition that may
appear weak and dispersed can, if properly constituted, have “a reality of strength.” Corbett
called this a “fleet in being”—a collection of ships that can quickly coalesce into a unified
fleet when necessary. This fleet in being would not need to dominate or sink other fleets;
it could be effective by seizing bases and policing choke points. Such a deceptively able
fleet, Corbett argued, should pursue an “active and vigorous life” in the conduct of limited
defense. 13 As it happened, Corbett's topic came out after the British Royal Navy had re-
duced its worldwide presence by leveraging the growing sea power of its allies Japan and
the United States.
Now the United States is in a position similar to that of Britain a hundred years ago.
America's Navy has been getting smaller in number: from around 600 ships during the
Cold War, to 350 during the 1990s, to 280 now, and with the possibility—because of
budget cuts and cost overruns—of going down to 250 in the coming years and decades. As
such, it is embracing naval allies such as India, Japan, Australia, and Singapore. The U.S.
Navy published a document in October 2007, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower,” that is more in the spirit of Corbett, with its emphasis on cooperation, than of
Mahan, with its emphasis on dominance. “Our Nation's interests,” goes the document, “are
best served by fostering a peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks
of trade, finance, information, law, people, and governance.” As the U.S. Navy sees it, our
world is increasingly interconnected, with the global population clustered in pulsing demo-
graphic ganglia near the seas that will be prone to great disruptions, such as asymmetric
attacks and natural disasters. Even great power conflicts, the document says, are apt to be