Materiel Command and the Materiality of Commands: An Historical Examination of the US Air Force, Control Data Corporation, and the Advanced Logistics System - History of Computing: Learning from the Past - page 96

operating system (developed for its 3000 and 6000 series of computers)[6] and “Mul-
tiple Data Base” (originally developed by CDC for the NASA Skylab project) that
were better suited to a batch environment than ZODIAC (a transaction-oriented
processing system)[24]. CDC leaders saw its offer of these two programs as helping
with the Air Force's ALS “get well plan.”[24]
General Bailey retired early in 1974 and General Louis Alder succeeded him as
deputy chief of staff, comptroller, Headquarters AFLC, overseeing ALS beginning in
May 1974 [29]. By August, with continuing ALS problems, Adler presented a briefing
to the AFLC Commander, General Catton. Catton proceeded to halt future program-
ming efforts on ALS on August 23, 1974 and launch an internal assessment [2]. He
wrote to General David Jones, chief of staff, Air Force that he had “placed too much
confidence in General Bailey,” who had long been “overly optimistic” about ALS [2].
Catton summarized three reasons for the projects severe shortcomings: 1) the unified
data bank was unproven (size precluded efficient processing); 2) the hardware and the
software (both vendor and Air Force) were generally untested; 3) concurrent develop-
ment of the operating software by the Air Force and CDC has “proved impractical.”
[2] Catton retired later that year and cited the ALS implementation effort as his great-
est career disappointment [2]. The problems were soon disclosed to the US Congress
and the Secretary of Defense [2]. 16 A congressional investigation followed and in De-
cember 1975 the ALS project was terminated. From planning to shut down, it had been
a nine-year effort with an expenditure of approximately $250 million. The Secretary of
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, soon authorized a plan for a new inventory management
system using machine independent software [6]. 17
Once the whistle was blown on ALS, the GAO completed a report on the project
[6]. While the report does cite some issues with CDC hardware and software, it
overwhelmingly places the blame for the project's failure with the Air Force. In
summary, the GAO stated:
Many factors contributed to the Air Force's unsuccessful system design
and development efforts. But the major factor was that the Air Force
did not manage the system as a complex, high-risk program that
stressed computer equipment capabilities and software technology.
Although the Air Force was aware of potential technological…
[problems]… it did not exercise prudent management when system
development problems occurred [6].
Even though the overwhelming blame in the GAO Report was placed with the Air
Force, CDC leaders took issue with the fact that the report neglected to emphasize
(mentioning only briefly) the “serious inadequacies” of the original Air Force specifi-
cations. In a response letter to the GAO, Robert Price cited a government contract
panel that had evaluated and reported on ALS in 1974 stating:
16 An earlier disclosure to Congress was made in April 1974 by two employees at McClellen
Air Force Base (Sacramento, California) in a letter to California Senator Alan Cranston. This
correspondence indicated that the project was a waste of money and not achieving its
goals.
17 Subsequent efforts in applying advanced IT to logistics moved at a more measured pace.