Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
importation of wheat grain by NFA at the request of the flour millers—a mutu-
ally beneficial arrangement: NFA's sale of wheat to the flour millers at a fixed
price enabled the latter to continue their flour milling operations, while the rise
in the price of bread in the local market was contained. This scheme also pre-
vented undue demand for rice, which NFA was also importing from a thin world
market. NFA found a stable and adequate source of income in wheat trading,
which explains why the agency's ad hoc involvement in wheat imports was ex-
tended to 10 years—substantially beyond the time when the wheat situation had
normalized.
By the second half of the 1970s NFA was regarded as a major success in
governance. It embodied the government's improved capability to manage food
insecurity. The country started to export rice. Although this outcome was as re-
sult of the Department of Agriculture's rice productivity program, NFA was
seen to be an indispensable partner of the department, particularly in post-
harvest and marketing. The agency demonstrated that it could manage the price
crises involving rice and corn and their respective substitutes. The warehouses
and mills were strategically located in the country. NFA was the most impor-
tant and strategic grain trader in the country. Local food shortages, particularly
those caused by natural calamities, were swiftly and adequately relieved with
grain stocks coming out of NFA warehouses. And the agency's programs did
not require a major budgetary outlay, because NFA had an important source of
income from importing wheat, corn, and rice.
This success created the next opportunity to expand and further compli-
cate the agency's charter. The impetus for this change came from then newly
created Ministry of Human Settlements, headed by the former first lady of the
country, Minister Imelda Marcos. In 1981, former President Marcos issued PD
1770, which gave the agency the mandate to implement a pro-poor program. In
a way, the agency already had such a program, although by that time it was not
recognized as such. The agency distributed foodgrain at subsidized prices. The
added mandate broadened the scope of this program to include nongrain house-
hold necessities as well. In response, NFA launched the
Kadiwa
program, op-
erating mobile and stationary retail stores in urban centers and depressed areas
in many parts of the country. These stores carried those food items that NFA
considered to be basic—rice, sugar, cooking oil, coffee, milk, and noodles—and
sold these items at subsidized prices.
poultry operators to request NFA to import yellow corn for feed manufacture. Corn had been among
the commodities that NFA could trade, but the understanding then was that corn, in this case, was
intended for food. When feedgrain prices went up in 1977, corn destined for human consumption
was diverted for livestock use, which caused food corn prices to rise as well. Although the inter-
vention of NFA at that time was consistent with the agency's mandate, the transient problem was
met with a rather permanent solution—inclusion into the agency's charter of this additional re-
sponsibility. Thus, even after the global yellow corn market normalized, NFA continued to be an
important player in the domestic feedgrain market.
