How buildings fail - ICE Manual of Structural Design: Buildings - page 151

revealed that the failure occurred with a water pressure equal to
67 m water depth, where the structure was designed to operate
in 82 m of water. This led to reviews in the analysis and detail-
ing of the reinforced concrete which found that the walls had
been modelled using a course FE mesh which was unable to
model real characteristics of the loaded shell structure and this
led to an underestimation of the tensile forces in the walls by
50%. Also, the detailing of the reinforcement failed to anchor
bars across the tri-cell wall into the compression region of the
opposite cell walls leading to insufficient reinforcement to pre-
vent shear failure at the joint ( Figure 9.6 ).
Detailed knowledge of FEA and material behaviour is thus
essential when analysing structures and where possible critical
areas should always be analysed separately using alternative
models or refined FE models. This ensures that detailed load-
ing effects and forces are catered for in the design.
Here, the detailing of structures has been shown to be a con-
tributing factor in the failure of the structure. Structural detail-
ing requires experience and training both by the drafter and the
checking engineer to ensure that the drawings adequately com-
municate the design intentions whilst being 'buildable' for an
experienced contractor. The overall safety of the structure should
be under the supervision of the most experienced engineer and
in the United States this is the Engineer of Record (EoR) who
signs off the design and construction drawings. However, errors
can also occur with this system especially when elements of
design are changed or become the contracted responsibility of
others, such as connection design by the fabricator.
This was a key issue in the Hyatt walkway collapse in
Kansas City, 1980, where a catalogue of revisions, missing
detail information on drawings and fabricator changes to the
hanger support led to the aerial walkways being constructed
without being adequately designed. It was later found that the
connection details were not sufficient to support the service

loadings under the local building design code (Delatte, 2009)
let alone the increased loads at the hotel function that night.
Unfortunately, 114 people died and 200 people injured when
two of the aerial walkways collapsed in the hotel lobby leading
to billions of dollars in damages awarded to the victims, their
families and rescuers.
This highlights the issues regarding the responsibilities of
the whole construction team involved in any design, regardless
of their contractual responsibilities, to ensure that the materi-
als used, the design of the structural elements and the overall
structural system are all fit for purpose.

9.8 Conclusion
There are many mechanisms of building failure that need to
be considered, from the initial scheme design and material
selection through to analysis, detailed design and construction
completion.
Consideration has also to be given to the serviceability
issues which may, over time, lead to degradation of the struc-
ture and a subsequent reduction of the structural capacity lead-
ing to failure.
Most importantly, the responsibility for the design, the con-
struction stability and the serviceability of the structure should
be allocated to an experienced and qualified engineer to ensure
that the design and materials are adequate for inclusion in the
permanent works.

9.9 References
Bates, W. (1984). Historical Structural Steelwork Handbook . London:
BCSA.
Bonshor, R. B. and Bonshor, L. L. (1996). Cracking in Buildings .
London: Construction Research Communications.
Building Research Establishment (1981). Assessment of Chemical
Attack of HAC Concrete. (BRE IP22/81). London: BRE.
Delatte, N. J. Jr. (2009). Beyond Failure: Forensic Case Studies for
Civil Engineers. Virginia: American Society of Civil Engineers.
Driscoll, R. and Skinner, H. (2007). Subsidence Damage to Domestic
Buildings . Watford: IHS BRE Press.
Dunster, A., Bigland, D., Reeves, B. and Holton, I. (2000). Durability
of Pre-cast HAC Concrete in Buildings (BRE IP8/00). Watford:
IHS BRE Press.
Egan, J. (1998). Rethinking Construction . London: Department of
Environment, Transport and the Regions. London: HMSO.
Griffiths, H., Pugsley, A. and Saunders, O. (1968). Report of the
Inquiry into the Collapse of Flats at Ronan Point, Canning Town .
Ministry of Housing and Local Government. London: HMSO.
Health and Safety Executive (2010). HSE Guidance - Asbestos .
[Available at www.hse.gov.uk/asbestos/issues.htm]
Holland, R. (1997). Appraisal and Repair of Reinforced Concrete
Structures . London: Thomas Telford.
Hossain, M. A. (2009). Building Failure . [Available at http://cm-
guide.org/archives/1945]
IStructE (1990). The Achievement of Structural Adequacy in
Buildings. London: Institution of Structural Engineers.
IStructE (2000). Subsidence of Low-Rise Buildings, 2nd edn. London:
Institution of Structural Engineers.

Deflection of
wall

Kinked
reinforcing
bars

Crack
Spalled concrete

Figure 9.6 Reinforced concrete failure - Sleipner A Oil Platform
(Rombach, 2004)