Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
Monitoring verifi cation and compliance with obligations
International environmental law differs from traditional international law in
the manner in which it obligates parties to an international environmental
agreement to actually observe their obligations. The main rule in general
international law is that if state A violates its obligation the injured state B can
take the following measures:
1 State B can fi rst attempt to settle the dispute politically: that is, by negotiation,
or through mediation by a third party.
2
If still unsatisfi ed, state B can take the dispute to a court of arbitration or an
international court of justice, with the consent of the parties to the dispute;
(consent is not necessary in certain legal procedures such as WTO dispute
settlement procedures). In most cases, states will try to settle the dispute
themselves through negotiation rather than submitting it to legal procedures.
3
In many cases, the injured state can only react to a treaty violation by coun-
termeasures. Countermeasures are measures taken by the injured state that
would normally be contrary to international law; they are rendered lawful
because they are a justifi ed response to state A's earlier breach. The obvious
result in many cases is a vicious spiral: state A denies having violated its
obligations towards state B, and in turn takes its own countermeasures in
response to the measure taken by state B.
Such processes will hardly advance international environmental regulation.
The objective is to combat or even eliminate an international environmental
threat (which is harmful for all treaty parties). It is therefore vital, as far as
possible, to avoid mutual disputes related to non-observance of treaty regula-
tions. Most environmental treaties do include an article relating to dispute
settlement. Yet normally this just encourages states to settle their disputes via
the means they themselves deem appropriate. In other words, by becoming
parties to international environmental treaties, states do not necessarily commit
to legally binding third-party dispute settlement, such as arbitration or submis-
sion of the dispute to the ICJ.
Environmental treaties take a different approach and aim at settling violations
through collective implementation committees. A meeting of the parties gener-
ally establishes the reporting procedures and nominates an implementation
committee tasked with creating ways of processing violations so that they cause
as little damage as possible to the overall functioning of the agreement system.
The implementation of a treaty (and possible violations) is reviewed by the
implementation committee and/or at meetings of the parties. These committees
can only function if they are advised as to how states are observing their obliga-
tions. The information they receive should be as objective as possible. This is a
diffi cult arrangement, but environmental treaties have gradually managed to
create procedures that at the very least yield better information about how states
implement and apply treaties.
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