Biomedical Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
Figure C.3
intakes and mechanical rooms alone may not
stop a sufficiently determined person. Secu-
rity personnel, barriers that deter loitering,
intrusion detection sensors, and observa-
tion cameras can further increase protec-
tion by quickly alerting personnel to security
breaches near the outdoor air intakes or other
vulnerable locations.
mailrooms, and loading docks, their HVAC
systems should be isolated and the areas
maintained at a negative pressure relative
to the rest of the building, but at positive
pressure relative to the outdoors. Physical
isolation of these areas (well-sealed floor to
roof-deck walls, sealed wall penetrations) is
critical to maintaining the pressure differen-
tial and requires special attention to ensure
airtight boundaries between these areas and
adjacent spaces. In some building designs
(those having lobbies with elevator access,
for example), establishing a negative pres-
sure differential will present a challenge.
A qualified HVAC professional can assist
in determining if the recommended isolation
is feasible for a given building. In addi-
tion, lobbies, mailrooms, and loading docks
should not share a return-air system or return
pathway (e.g., ceiling plenum) with other
5.
Isolate lobbies, mailrooms, loading docks,
and storage areas
. Lobbies, mailrooms
(includes various mail processing areas),
loading docks, and other entry and storage
areas should be physically isolated from the
rest of the building. These are areas where
bulk quantities of CBR agents are likely to
enter a building. Building doors, including
vestibule and loading dock doors, should
remain closed when not in use.
To prevent widespread dispersion of
a
contaminant
released within
lobbies,
