Biomedical Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
Appendix C Protecting Building
Environments from Airborne Chemical,
Biological, or Radiological Attacks
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH ANDHUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY ANDHEALTH
Scope
This document identifies actions that a building
owner or manager can implement without undue
delay to enhance occupant protection from an
airborne chemical, biological, or radiological
(CBR) attack. The intended audience includes
building owners, managers, and maintenance
personnel of public, private, and governmental
buildings, including offices, laboratories, hospitals,
retail facilities, schools, transportation terminals,
and public venues (for example, sports arenas,
malls, coliseums). This document is not intended to
address single-family or low-occupancy residential
housing (less than five family units). Higher risk
facilities such as industrial facilities, military facil-
ities, subway systems, and law enforcement facili-
ties require special considerations that are beyond
the scope of this guide.
The likelihood of a specific building being
targeted for terrorist activity is generally difficult to
predict. As such, there is no specific formula thatwill
determine a certain building's level of risk. Building
owners must make their own decisions about how
to reduce their building's risk to a CBR attack.
These decisions may be aided by a comprehensive
building security assessment. Many government
and private organizations have identified resources
that provide insight into building security assess-
ments. The reference list at the end of this document
will help the reader obtain this information.
No building can be fully protected from a deter-
mined individual who is intent on releasing a CBR
agent. The recommendations in this guide will not
preclude injuries or fatalities in the event of a CBR
release. However, facility owners and managers
can transform their buildings into less attractive
targets by increasing the difficulty of introducing
a CBR agent, by increasing the ability to detect
terrorists before they carry out an intended release,
and by incorporating plans and procedures to miti-
gate the effects of a CBR release. Some of the
references listed in the back of this document
can provide information on how to recognize if
a CBR release has occurred. These recommenda-
tions focus on airborne releases of CBR agents
a
in
quantities capable of being easily transported by
a few individuals. Protection from other types of
attacks such as explosions, building collapses, and
water supply contamination require much different
measures and are not addressed in this document.
The recommendations set forth in this document
are not intended to be a minimum requirement
that every building owner and manager should
implement for every building. Rather, the decisions
concerning which protective measures should be
implemented for any building should be based on
several factors, including the perceived risk associ-
ated with the building and its tenants, engineering
and architectural feasibility, and cost.
a
Note
: References to a release of CBR agent in this document will always refer to an airborne CBR release.
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