Biomedical Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
of the cutover from commercial power to a
new $5.9 million hospital co-generation system,
with the failure of a $10.00 part, caused the
evacuation of an entire hospital, potentially life-
threatening patient care events and huge loss
of revenue. Most of the patients transferred out
were not returned to the hospital after power
was restored. This power failure lasted over
8 hours.
at about 1500 which caused a more significant
loss of communication. Reason for the failure
of fiber-optic cables is still unknown.
•
Lewis County, WA—February 2004—
Approximately 8:40 AM, the hospital's
internal phone system went dead. Investigation
identified that the UPS (Uninterruptible Power
Supply) failed, which shorted out the ability
to turn on the back-up battery function. The
hospital's emergency fail-safe phones were
turned on manually and were affected also.
Some did not have dial tones. Some could
make calls out of the facility, but could not get
calls in. Additionally, staff members reported
that they could not call out on their cell phones.
Power was returned to the telephone system
about 9:55 AM by re-wiring around the UPS.
Hospital communications were limited for
2-3 hours [8].
•
King County, WA—2001—a lightning strike
to a metropolitan hospital took out hospital
switchboard for several hours. Another hospital
in Pierce County, WA took a lightning strike to
a radio antenna, which completely melted the
fiberglass mast and the metal parts of it. This
was not discovered until they noticed that the
coaxial cable was charred, and the radio was
not working.
•
Whatcom Co., WA—2002—There have been
two separate instances of communication
disruption to an entire community, including
9-1-1 systems, when someone dug up the fiber-
optic lines feeding the county communications
system. Both disruptions lasted several hours.
During these periods, there was no way for
patients to contact emergency services, or for
hospital to contact staff, patients, vendors, or
ambulances. Both instances took several hours
to restore service.
17.4 Redundant Systems and Pathways
Every hospital communication system should
have multiple routes for incoming and outgoing
messages. Phone and electrical systems should
have multiple access points to the facility, and
multiple Central Office connections. Single-point
access paths are bound to fail eventually. In addi-
tion to multiple access points, there should be a
variety of systems to perform similar functions.
Reliance on any single communication system
could result in serious adverse events for the
hospital. The capacity to do this depends on the
telecommunications and information technology
departments within the facility. Technology is
expensive and complex, but lack of communica-
tions can be even more expensive in the long run.
Amateur Radio can contribute significantly
to recovery from a communications failure by
providing backup emergency communications
until normal systems are restored. In each of
the above mentioned events, amateur radio oper-
ators were called in to provide communications
to support the hospital mission. Depending on the
facility, these resources were used to greater or
lesser degree. But each facility learned that the
amateur radio operators really could provide the
•
Clallam County, WA—February 2004—A Port
Angeles hospital reported that the entire
community had lost Internet, 800, long
distance, Metro call paging as well as cell phone
coverage. The call came via wireless cell phone
from a cell tower on Vancouver Island, B.C.
This single Verizon cell phone was apparently
the only means of communications outside of
Port Angeles that the hospital was aware of.
Their contingency plan, should they need aero-
medical evacuation or other assistance would
be to use this phone or someone would go
to the nearby Coast Guard Station which had
communication with Seattle Coast Guard. Due
to topography (Olympic Mountains) there is no
line of sight communications from Seattle to
Port Angeles. Apparently a second cable failed
