Institutional factors in natural resource management in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa - Institutional Constraints to Small Farmer Development in Southern Africa - page 235

Besides unfavourable practices, problems and disputes over the use of natural resources can
also result in conflicts. For example, Sanginga et al. (2007), in their research on the dynamics
of social capital and conflict management in multiple resource regimes, discovered that
almost all farmers have been involved in conflict over the use and management of natural
resources. There was, however, no significant difference in the number of conflicts reported
by men and women. These conflicts, which involved a variety of stakeholders and resource
users, were grouped into three broad categories: community-level conflicts opposing farmers
within same communities; intercommunity conflicts opposing different communities or
farmers from neighbouring villages, and supra-community conflicts opposing farmers and
communities with higher-level formal institutions or individuals.
Regarding collective action choice, Dasgupta (1995), cited by Adhikari (2001),
hypothesized that higher growth rate negatively affects the likelihood of collective action.
The extension service is one of the variables having an impact on the management of
rangelands. For example, in their study on the impact of social, institutional and ecological
factors on land management practices in mountain watersheds of Nepal, Paudel and Thapa
(2003) revealed extension services as the strongest factor influencing the adoption of land
management practices. This indicates a positive relationship between extension service and
resource management. Table 10.3 illustrates variables used for analysing institutional factors
on communal rangelands. These variables were developed from Ostrom's (1990) design
principles, cited by Nilsson (2001).
Nilsson (2001) in his research on the management of communal rangelands in Endabeg
used these principles as variables to describe institutional factors governing the use of
communal grazing land in Endabeg. Some of the results showed that the penalty commonly
used to pay damages for minor violations include, inter alia , defined amount of local brew,
which is perceived as favourable compared to costly legal action. In addition, monetary
fines are also used to punish rule breakers. Conflict resolution mechanisms are not directly
applicable to grazing on communal grazing of Endabeg because everyone seemed to accept
the condition of open access. The normal procedure when a conflict occurs is that the sub-
village chairman sits down together with the accused person and a group of respected elders
to solve the conflict in a composed manner.
Besides the above institutional arrangements, information on the attributes of the resources
and attributes of the community is also of importance. As a result these attributes are also
included in an IAD analysis framework The assumption is that these attributes also have an
impact on the effectiveness of the institutional arrangements.