Comparative Research Design - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 71

state agencies are sought after because they provide an additional source of income through
bribes. If they are given to a network companion they are usually 'bought' (just like well paying
jobs in the private economy). According to media reports after the fall of the Akaev regime,
fees for government positions range from 30,000 USD to 200,000 USD, others estimate even
up to 500,000 USD (Marat 2006: 126f; Lewis 2006: 29; Dethier 2003: 25). Dukenbaev and
Hansen (2003: 9) state for Kyrgyzstan: „Nearly everyone who has ever held any public posi
tion whatsoever, beginning with the lowliest policeman, is vulnerable to such charges [of cor
ruption] as the entire system is so riddled with corruption that there is virtually no one who has
not engaged in it“. In Tajikistan, the high level of corruption is supported by the weak legal
framework and limited access to information that allows arbitrary fees to be levied by officials.
Much of the corruption is also part of the extensive drug and weapon trade that is estimated to
be linked to 30 50% of the economy (Jones Luong 2003: 28).
After this introduction to the general characteristics of neopatrimonialism in the two case
studies, the following sub chapters will describe how the identified independent variables are
penetrated by the neopatrimonial characteristics and by a complex interaction of formal and
informal institutions.

5.5.2

Institutions of Decision Making

As was outlined in the chapter 4.2, institutionalist policy analysis assumes that orientations and
actions of political actors are shaped by institutions, be they formal or informal. In line with
this approach, the first identified variable is the institutional design of the decision making
process. This encompasses all formal and informal rules that regulate which actors gain access
to the decision making processes and their interaction. The analysis also includes the identifica
tion of key actors and their interests and strategies. Many features of this variable were already
mentioned in the previous chapter on general features of neopatrimonialism. The institutions
of decision making are directly dependent on the degree of democracy and patronage. Deci
sion making processes in neopatrimonial states are characterized by a strong dominance of the
president and his circle and by the dominance of particularistic interests in contrast to common
welfare interests. The value of this variable differs with regard to the degree of openness and
inclusiveness of the process according to the authoritarian character of the regime. Is it a small
group of key actors that defines policy priorities or can the public and the concerned public
bodies participate? In both case studies, decision making follows mainly internal agenda setting
and rule formulation without public participation.
Kyrgyzstan
In the previous chapter, the dominance of the President and his apparatus was already de
scribed. This apparatus dominates decision making, while the ministries have less influence and
the Parliament is widely marginalized. While factual decision making does not necessarily fol
low formal procedures, there are at least regulations regarding the consultation in law devel
opment processes which are applied. However, they may not be effective as informal decision
making is outweighing the formal procedures. As was said before, parties do not form ideolog
ical blocs, but often present certain social or regional networks rather than ideological move
ments. They do not exert meaningful influence in the agenda setting process or during the
formulation of policies. NGOs were targets of numerous capacity building programs that