Comparative Research Design - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 69

In Soviet times, patronage networks were critical for gaining access to resources. These net
works were also decisive regarding cadre politics and the allocation of positions. The Soviet
Union had an extended informal economy and bribing officials was a general norm in order to
get public benefits. Horizontal networks for redistribution as well as clientelistic patronage
networks (vertical) were very important (Hensell 2004; Geiss 2006). 68
Therefore, in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan clientelistic structures existed at the time of inde
pendence. To these structures, independence was less of a revolution than a restoration (Starr
2006: 9). During the transformation period, patronage systems provided stability and security
that state structures were no longer able to guarantee, neither on the state nor on the local
level. Nowadaya, clientelism shapes politics at the highest level the selection of the president
as well as on the local level. The presidents, and other people in power positions, are respon
sible to the regional patronage network that brought them into power. In contrast to the for
mal rules outlined in the constitution, the realities and practices of politics build on personal,
regional and clientelistic coalitions, thereby enforcing regional identities and personal loyalties
(Dukenbaev, Hansen 2003: 6; Abdullaev 2004: 7f; Collins 2002: 142; BTI 2006: 15, 2003a: 13).
The Tajik civil war was also driven by the competition for power between the leaders of
different regionally based patronage networks. Collins (2002) classifies Kyrgyzstan as well as
Tajikistan as “clan hegemonies” with weak institutionalized, strongly personalistic informal
regimes where the meso level is the most important political level as this is where resource
distribution along kin networks takes place. She argues that superficially, Kyrgyzstan appears to
have certain democratic features, however, they are hardly enforced and reforms are only car
ried out in order to fulfill the condions of the IFIs. She distinguishes Kyrgyzstan from Tajikis
tan by categorizing the former as consensual clan hegemony and the latter as a confrontative
clan hegemony. Other scholars mention that the role of clans might be exaggerated as Western
scholars pay unnecessary attention to this issue due its exoticness, and Central Asian officials
exaggerate the threat of regional disparities to raise more international aid. Therefore, these
scholars question the stability and impact of clan networks in practice (see Bichsel 2006: 79;
Lewis 2006: 2). Consequently, Jones Luong (2002) as well as Dukenbaev and Hansen (2003)
use the term regionalism instead of clan politics. While this is somewhat confusing due to the
fact that different meanings of the term already exist, it evolved as a keyword often referred to
in discourses on Central Asia. It can be defined as follows. Clan affiliations often correlate with
regional identities and are connected a certain region. By emphasizing regions instead of clans,
the construction of those identities becomes apparent. Regionalism then can be understood as
a power struggle between different elite groups with their respective patronage networks that
are based on geographic and ethnic attributes as the basis of their legitimacy. Such an approach
does not frame regional identities as pre Soviet forms of collective identity that are still effec
tive nor as newly re emerging identity patterns. Rather, it perceives today's identity based net
works to be a result of Soviet politics which affected former identities. Regionalism in both
countries is a complex phenomenon but can only be briefly described here: Kyrgyzstan is
characterized by a 'north south conflict' between the northern provinces that are better off
economically, politically more powerful, and 'russified' and the southern provinces that are
68 The expansion of Soviet power to peripheral regions such as that of Central Asia was not a result of party politics
and establishment of strong state structure, but rather resulted from the expansion of the clientelistic networks of
Stalin. Elite recruitment occurred mainly through patronage networks. A main characteristic of the development of the
strong Soviet state in the two decades after the October revolution was exactly the above-mentioned combination of
formal bureaucratic institutions and informal networks. Soviet nationality and cadre policies reinforced patrimonial
structures instead of serving to abolish them (Geiß 2004: 26f; Dukenbaev, Hansen 2003: 18).