Comparative Research Design - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 63

In order to measure the impact of neopatrimonialism on water institutional reform (WIR), it
became evident during the research process that it is difficult to measure the effect of the dis
tinct features of neopatrimonialism directly. Rather, neopatrimonialism as a characteristic of
distinct institutional settings relevant to water governance influences WIR indirectly via these
institutional determinants. Thus, four variables were defined which grasp the characteristics of
neopatrimonialism and influence water institutional reform. These variables were identified by
combining an inductive proceeding with theoretical considerations (see above). They are pre
sented in Table 10. Two of the variables address the political process in a strict sense: first, the
institutions of decision making, hence the institutional conditions that define which actors take
part in the process and which issues are placed on the political agenda and will result in politi
cal decisions; second, the endogenous variable of inter and intra institutional linkages of water
institutions. The other two variables address the institutional environment of water gover
nance: the conditions of the agricultural sector and of local governance. They define the con
text of implementation of the WIR.
The shared categorization of both countries allows restricted generalizations on the pros
pects of institutional reforms in other neopatrimonial states. The category of the developing,
neopatrimonial state includes many of today's countries where water reforms occur. The study
hence provides insights that might be of relevance tor all countries of this type. Both cases vary
within this type so that their comparison enables us to make inferences about the impact and
significance of certain aspects. Kyrgyzstan adopted formal changes to democracy and market
economy. In Tajikistan, in contrast, such changes were decided on to a much lesser extent and
state power remained weak. Do these formal changes matter in the face of informal patrimoni
al features and do they provide a strong opportunity for path change in Kyrgyzstan or do the
shared informal patterns dominate so that both countries show the same path dependent poli
cy outcomes?
The concept of neopatrimonialism in general was described in chapter 4.1. A neopatri
monial regime was defined as combining formal democratic structures with patrimonial fea
tures of autocratic and personalistic leadership, political clientelism, and endemic corruption.
In this section, first the peculiarities of neopatrimonialism in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will be
described. In the chapters thereafter (5.5.2 5.5.5), the three variables measuring the impact of
neopatrimonialism on water institutional reform as well as the role of donors as an interfering
variable will be explained.

5.5.1 General Features of Neopatrimonialism in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

This chapter shows how the above defined characteristics of the ideal type of neopatrimonial
ism manifest themselves in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and hence justify a classification of both
countries as hybrid neopatrimonial regimes.
Formal Democratic Institutions
The newly independent Central Asian states inherited the formal bureaucracy of the Soviet
republics and adopted formally democratic constitutions. Kyrgyzstan is formally a state with a
democratic constitution (adopted in 1993) guaranteeing separation of powers, rule of law, free
elections, and basic rights. The first years after independence were characterized by a process
of political and economic liberalization. Askar Akaev was the only Central Asian president who
had not been part of the Soviet communist party cadres before. Kyrgyzstan is the only Central