Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
3.2
Institutions
The most basic and most referred definition of institutions was given by North (1990) as the
„rules of the game“. It represents the least common denominator of what institutions are:
They regulate social life by postulating rules and sanctioning violation. Sanctioning can work
by formal mechanisms sanctions in a narrow sense or by informal ones such as social dis
approval or the loss of reputation. The specific definitions disperse, mainly in how these rules
are codified, how they become effective, and how much space for choice they leave. In the
general understanding of institutions this study follows the broad definition used by most
scholars of sociological institutionalism.
In this view, an institution is a social relation or behavior that “come[s] to be taken for
granted” (DiMaggio, Powell 1991: 9), i.e. which can be anticipated. It involves not only rules
and norms, but also the symbolic and cognitive systems underlying those norms and rules. The
cognitive system is important to include as it creates a 'perceptual frame' which “determines
how the member of the institutions interprets data from the environment” (Peters 2001: 103).
Shared cognitions define which choice will make sense and which behavior is perceived as
possible, which options are 'seen' by the actors: “Institutions influence behavior not simply by
specifying what one should do but also by specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a
given context” (Hall, Taylor 1996: 948). When actors face choices, they orient at experiences in
comparable situations, at standards of behavior transmitted by culture and history. They will
look for an appropriate behavior, and “what is appropriate for a particular person in a particu
lar situation is defined by political and social institutions and transmitted through socialization”
(March, Olsen 1989: 23). Sociological institutionalists are therefore interested in “the ways in
which institutions complicate and constitute the paths by which solutions are sought” (DiMag
gio, Powell 1991: 11).
SI does not negate that actors can behave in a rational, strategic, and utility maximizing
way. However, what is perceived as rational and as beneficial is a result of institutions and not
stable and universal (as RCI assumes). Rather, the preferences, interests, and objectives of
individuals are socially and culturally constituted. An institution simply defined as rule or norm
can be violated in principle if one is ready to bear the costs (be they material or ideal by loss of
reputation). The SI definition leaves fewer choices to the actors: Institutions become effective
before the question of what is socially acceptable behavior emerges. The actor does not perce
ive other potential options. However, it has to be stressed that institutions are not determinant
but still leave a certain range of choices be it by a certain institutional corridor or by the
option to look for appropriate strategies from other institutional logics available.
Historical institutionalism in principle also defines institutions rather broadly as “formal
or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational
structure of the polity” (Hall, Taylor 1996: 938), as those “that shape how political actors de
fine their interests and that structure their relations of power to other groups” (Thelen, Stein
mo 1992: 2). In practice, however, scholars of this direction tend to narrow it down to organi
zations and rules and customs proclaimed by formal organizations. HI never refers to institu
tions in mono causalism but sees them accompanied by other factors in explanation. Factors
such as the spreading of ideas, the economic situation, and aspects outside the domestic realm
also play a role for policy outcomes. The concept of the
institutional corridor
illustrates the under
standing of institutions as putting a bias on perceptions and objectives and excluding certain
options, but still leaving space for choices made by actors.
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