Environmental Engineering Reference
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non payment, the economic and technical obstacles would persist. As long as these basic con
ditions for reasonable ISF are not met it might be wise to turn away from a dogmatic approach
towards water payment. Though the long term goal can be an ISF according to used water, for
a transition period payment per crop and ha could be a better solution. This practice is used
widespread around the world as it is easier and less cost intensive to implement than a volume
tric system and, therefore, often more efficient as well (Johansson et al. 2002: 185f). It would
reduce costs of measurement technique,
mirabs
, etc. When WUAs got stronger, farmers better
trained, and the economic and technical situation better after a number of years, one could
switch to payment per cubic meter. There is also the option of combining both ways, a basic
charge per ha combined with a volumetric fee. Alymbeava (2004: 20) proposes that a volume
tric charge to the
RaiVodKhoz
should be combined with a fix O&M fee to the WUA. This
would also make financial planning for WUAs more reliable: The pure volumetric payment
means that in years with much precipitation (i.e. when farmers use less water) the WUA would
not receive the expected income and could not pay salaries or credit rates (DFID, Mott Mac
Donald 2003: 11 21). This aspect points to another pitfall in the ISF efficiency link: volumetric
water charges may, on the one hand, decrease demand; on the other hand, they may increase
supply: As the financial survival of the water distributing agency or WUA depends on fees, it
has an interest in encouraging water use (Hellegers, Perry 2006: 81).
Given these experiences, it is increasingly acknowledged that the respective context the
institutional conditions, the political will, and the interests of different stakeholders deter
mine success of failure of ISF reforms and that blueprint reform processes developed external
ly without national ownership and without acknowledging special conditions will not promise
to meet their objectives (see e.g. Azevedo, Baltar 2005). This insight has to be transferred into
practice.
Adopting a Long Term Perspective
One main challenge of water institutional reforms is that their benefits are long term and/or
intangible: ownership, reduced conflict potential, transparency of water distribution, reliable
water service, and accountability are not readily visible and difficult to communicate. Yet, na
tional decision makers as well as international donors usually have a short term perspective;
results have to be achieved before the next election or project evaluation respectively. There
fore, short term incentives are set, e.g. grants for rehabilitation, in order to achieve commit
ment to WUA or ISF reforms. The support provided by donor projects also aims for the es
tablishing of formal structures and capacity building for the holders of functions (seminars),
rather than for broad community awareness, and accountability and transparency of office
holders to the WUA members. In addition, incentives alone can also have conversel effects.
For instance, it may be an incentive for water administration and FSK to free themselves of
responsibility for run down irrigation infrastructure, it presents no incentive for farmers to care
for an irrigation set that is extremely deteriorated and needs a lot of capital investments. Also
the need for increasing the ISF due to WUA administrative costs rather works discouraging
than stimulating.
The only tangible, short term incentive in WUA reform in particular is the mentioned
access to loans and grants, which can also motivate individual farmers. However, when this is
the only incentive for WUA establishment, the interest is to set it up quickly and not to change
attitudes of water users. This fits with interest of the programs to set up as much WUAs as
possible. This can have negative impacts on the sustainability (long term durability) of WUAs:
Farmers have to see a value in participating and engaging in the WUA also after the comple
tioan of rehabilitation. Otherwise, the fate of the Central Asian WUAs could be similar to
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