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dependency, and hence, to similar reform results? Or is the bigger critical juncture in Kyrgyzs
tan with more formal democratization, decentralization, economic liberalization enabling a
path change, which may be not possible in Tajikistan?
Historical legacies are still shaping water institutions. In the first years, water laws contin
ued Soviet regulations. The water administration is still characterized by a strong hierarchical
cul ture, strong fragmentation, lack of horizontal coordination, and no experience in own poli
cy formulation legacies from the Soviet Union. The immediate context with reorganization
of administrative structures, constant curtailing of financial allocations, and donor pressure to
reduce state expenses fosters the predominance of organizational self interest in the preserva
tion of the status quo. These aspects are similar in both countries. In Kyrgyzstan, these old
administrative patterns are stronger threatened by reforms, what consequently also led to more
resistance.
However, despite the interest in preventing change, many reforms have been decided on.
Laws have been changed and new policies formulated, which overcome Soviet water gover
nance patterns. If one were to only look at the formal aspects, like laws and decrees issued, it
could be concluded that a path change took place in both countries and that one institutional
arrangement was substituted by another. On a formal level, new institutions have been estab
lished: laws have been approved, WUAs have been registered, and fees have been introduced,
etc. However, these policy decisions are either not at all, only partly, or only on paper imple
mented.
In practice, new institutions are transformed according to the existing institutional logics.
The economic aspect to introduce ISF is not implemented because the de capitalized agrarian
sector does not provide the necessary economic and institutional preconditions. Additionally, it
contradicts established norms of usage. ISF are undermined by informal practices that are
partly institutionalized. The political aspect to make WUAs an instrument of participation and
equitable water distribution threatens existing patterns of political culture and societal norms.
WUAs are introduced, but are incorporated in the patronage systems and the donors as well.
While it would be the task of the WUA to control water withdrawal, guarantee timely water
delivery to those who paid, and punish violation of the rules, this is not fulfilled. The adminis
trative aspect of arranging water management along hydrographic boundaries and enhancing
inter sectoral coordination is contested by the administration itself. Here as well, formal deci
sions have been taken without working in practice.
Does this mean that formal changes do not have any meaning at all and are undermined
in both states similarly by informal patrimonial practices? That is also not the case. The de
tailed look shows differences between the two countries. To grasp these differences and devel
opments, the concept of institutional bricolage is more appropriate than the other two men
tioned as it allows tracing back continuities as well as changes and the interaction of both.
Based on this, the strategic options these interactions and co existences offer for the actors can
be assessed. Institutional reform in water governance is rather a complex process of institu
tional bricolage than the simple displacement of institutions like it would seem if we look only
at the formal aspects. Actors in decision making as well as in implementation influence the
outcome of reform through their selective adoption of certain rules which seem appropriate or
instrumental (as water fees or transfer of responsibilities), but do neglect others that do not
seem appropriate to existing logics (as democratic participation). Through bricolage, different
logics are mixed: Fees are paid, but not because the logic of market economy, but because the
patron (e.g., the
rais
or an
aksakal
) with their informal authority demand it. A formal democrat
ic WUA is established, but the way it distributes water is already predefined by the land plots
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