Comparing the Politics of Water Institutional Reform - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 181

administrative principles were even reinforced with the new nation states claiming sovereignty
on their respective water resources and abandoning the joint water energy system of the Aral
Sea basin.
Both countries introduced new management principles in their reformed Water Codes:
Both formulated a commitment to a management oriented at hydrographic boundaries, which
meant a restructuring of the current water administration. In Kyrgyzstan, the need for better
inter sectoral coordination was acknowledged and addressed as policy fragmentation is consi
dered one of the major obstacles for sound water governance. However, despite an apparent
consensus on the necessity of such an approach, efforts to overcome fragmentation were not
successful thus far. The reorganization along hydrographic boundaries in Kyrgyzstan is merely
cosmetic: while the name of the OblVodKhoz changed, the structure remained. In Tajikistan,
implementation measures have not yet been started at all. In both countries, the organizational
structures as inherited by the Soviet Union basically prolonged. Hydrographic management
principles however do not only concern river basins but small scale canal systems as well:
WUAs should ideally also be established along hydrographic boundaries. As was shown, this is
apart from those cases where administrative and hydrographic boundaries coincide hardly
the case. Water user associations are not a reversal from the administrative approach; they are
rather a supplement to the water bureaucracy, added at the lowest level.
As for the impact of the decision making process, it again can be said much more for
Kyrgyzstan than for Tajikistan. For Kyrgyzstan, it was shown that the resistance to the new
Water Code and also, therefore, the necessary longer development time was rooted in its new
regulations on the administrative structures. Agencies fear losses of competencies and subse
quently budget allocations and because of this block all reforms that threat their status quo.
This is connected with their insecure situation and their inability to reach financial stability by
other means, as Dethier (2003: 13) describes as general for administrative units in the CIS:
“There are often no effective mechanisms to force recognition at the political level of the
resource limits that exist and to force political choices in establishing expenditure priorities.”
Consequently, resistance to reform seems the only option to ensure finance. While public
choice theorists point to the fact that self interest is always one motivation guiding bureaucrats
(Araral 2005: 140), in neopatrimonial regimes it is their main interest. Posts are usually seen as
a source of revenue generation for the incumbent rather than as a duty for public service. This
influences the public administration as collective actor (in preserving its interests in decision
making) as well as the individuals in concrete job performance.
Under the insecure conditions of the transformation period, these interests count even
more. Since independence, the water administration has been threatened by a massive curtail
ing of their allotted means as well as by demands of donors to reduce staff and organizations.
Agencies in both countries suffered from a weakening of their position, and not only financial
ly: In Kyrgyzstan, the MinVodKhoz was dissolved and integrated into the Agricultural Ministry.
Hence, most resistance to administrative reform comes from the administration itself and less
from the exogenous factors.
However, local institutions also play a role in the transition to hydrographic management
principles, as envisaged by the WUAs. WUAs are generally not established along hydrographic
boundaries. Experts suggest that the administrative mode of management supports nepotism
and inequity in the water sector as the RaiVodKhoz are close to the raion administration and
provincial governors who interfere in the its performance. A pure hydrographic organization
would be less affiliated to local authorities, more independent from the administrative layers,