Comparing the Politics of Water Institutional Reform - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 167

hydropower, and environment, as well as the actors in these fields. In Kyrgyzstan, academic
institutes and to a lesser extent NGOs are involved in the political discourse, without real
impact on decision making, however. In Tajikistan, NGOs are only active in the implementa
tion arena. The analysis revealed coordination problems, resulting in overlapping competencies
on the one hand and responsibility gaps on the other hand. Especially in Kyrgyzstan, adminis
trative fragmentation was considered a serious problem.
The broad range of water governance institutions does not only entrench different sec
tors, but also different levels: At the international level, both states signed agreements that
restrict their usage of water resources. International discourses and actors bring in certain
norms on water governance, which has an impact. International donor organizations and
NGOs enter the national policy arena and established their own rules through conditionality
and project regulations. At the national level, primary policy directions are decided on by the
government, experts, and to a very limited degree the respective Parliaments. Legal reforms
in both countries could not speed up with the factually conducted projects, resulting in contra
dictions and ambiguities. At the provincial level, water agencies implement, but also have deci
sion making power in their area, on water distribution, for example. At local level, beside the
water agencies, formal and informal local governance bodies interact with each other and set
the framework to which water users orient themselves. WUAs are established as new non state
actors whose roles were initially vaguely defined in both states and are still contested in prac
tice. Also, the local governance structures are part of water governance, especially in Kyrgyzs
tan where the aiyl okmotu has been officially involved in the O&M of tertriary irrigation canals.
Thus, water governance has to regulate across different sectors and different levels.
A further challenge is integrating formal as well as informal institutions and organizations,
which may be in conflict with each other. This complexity was not addressed by the previous
approaches of water management. The governance perspective, in contrast, allows for an inte
gration of this complexity in the analysis: across sectors, scales, levels, and including formal as
well as informal rules. With the good water governance objective defined internationally, WIR
strive to establish water institutions that guarantee efficient, equitable, and sustainable usage of
water, and democratic governance structures. The ultimate objective of water institutional
reforms is to overcome identified shortcomings and gaps in the regulation and governance of
water resources.
Being post Soviet states depending on international aid, the challenges for water gover
nance in both countries are similar: Both countries have had to cope with a deteriorated infra
structure; with decreasing financial means and professional capacities; with the disintegration
of the regional water governance system; with a hierarchical governance system not adequate
to meet the new challenges; and with the necessity to develop an own policy strategy. In addi
tion, both states have been confronted with the same norms in the international discourse as to
what good water governance should look like. The primary incentives for conducting reforms
in the two states were budget crisis and donor pressure a situation similar to many develop
ing countries (Meinzen Dick et al. 1997: 13). Consequently, they share many reform projects in
response to international norms (management along hydrographic boundaries, decentraliza
tion, user participation, ISF) and to post Soviet needs (ISF, new legal framework, transboun
dary management).
The reforms conducted during the period of investigation (1991 2005) are listed in Table
16. The table shows for both countries policy decisions on reforms and indicates the year of
the respective law or decree. Decisions by law are indicated with dates in bold. The years in
brackets indicate that these were no special laws, decrees, or policy directives, but part of the