Comparing the Politics of Water Institutional Reform - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 166

8 Comparing the Politics of Water Institutional Reform

The previous two chapters offered a detailed description and analysis of water governance and
water institutional reforms in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This chapter aims to compare the
similarities and differences in both countries and to assess to what extent the identified va
riables are able to explain them. The first section compares the water governance structures
and the water institutional reforms in both states, thus the dependent variable (chapter 8.1).
The next part (8.2) discusses the role neopatrimonial features play and how donor policies
interfere with them. Subsequently, three sub chapters sum up the reform experience in both
countries under three thematic foci: first, the introduction of monetary economic mechanism
(8.3); second, the introduction of new administrative principles, namely hydrographic and
inter sectoral management approaches (8.4); and third, the involvement of stakeholders by way
of user participation and decentralization (8.5). After this comparison of the empirical findings,
we will turn to the theoretical assumptions formulated in the beginning. What do these cases
tell us about institutional change? Where can we identify path dependent developments? What
was the impact of the juncture both countries experienced was it critical? And finally, is the
ultimate result an outcome of path dependency, of path change, or of institutional bricolage?
This will be discussed in chapter 8.6. The final section of this comparative part (8.7) will ad
dress the question of which lessons can be learned from this analysis and should be considered
when conducting water institutional reforms.

8.1

Water Governance and Water Institutional Reforms in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

This thesis started with general considerations on water governance as an analytical perspective
and good water governance as a normative objective. It is based on the premise that the cur
rent water crisis is primarily caused by institutional designs and political decisions that prevent
equitable and sustainable usage of the limited water resources. The first step of analysis was to
identify the governance structure, meaning to conduct an 'institutional mapping' of actors and
organizations involved and their mutual relations. For both countries it was shown that water
is regulated by various state and non state actors at multiple levels.
Both states inherited a highly hierarchical and fragmented governance structure from the
Soviet Union, in which a distinct Ministry of Water Management ( MinVodKhoz ) was the main
organization with centralized power. It included a hierarchical structure of departments at the
republican, provincial and district levels. No noteworthy horizontal coordination existed.
These legacies still shape the current water governance structures. In Tajikistan, the organiza
tional structure remained more or less unchanged. In Kyrgyzstan, the MinVodKhoz was dis
solved and subordinated as DepVodKhoz to the Agricultural Ministry. Upward accountability
principles and lack of transparency are still characteristic for the institutional culture.
However, not only the water administration in the strict sense governs water. In both cas
es, it became obvious that it is necessary to include state as well as non state actors and struc
tures from other sectors into the analysis. This concerns regulations regarding land reform,